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STRK-20

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About

A shielded ledger on Starknet for any ERC-20 token, with private transfers and DeFi, where one auditor key can decrypt every user's history.


  • Total Value Locked
    $1.08 M1.15%
    across 7 assets and 7 buckets
  • TVL
    $1.08 M1.15%
  • Assets tracked
    7
  • Buckets tracked
    7
  • Deposits 7D
    12391.5%
  • Deposits 30D
    3.61 K
  • Deposits Total
    20.68 K

  • Privacy
    Link privacy
  • Trusted setup
  • Exit window
  • Reproducibility

  • Tracked on
    Starknet logo
  • Runs on
    Starknet logo
  • Attributes
    ZKTransfersDeFiAny amount
  • Reference app
    Bramble v0.10.7most private of 5 checked
  • Public observerChain analystNetwork observerPrivileged insiderFuture adversary

    About

    A shielded ledger on Starknet for any ERC-20 token, with private transfers and DeFi, where one auditor key can decrypt every user's history.

    STRK-20 lets the user shield any ERC-20 token on Starknet, send it privately, use it in DeFi and withdraw it to any address. Senders, amounts and which deposit funds which withdrawal stay hidden inside the pool. Deposits, withdrawals, the first payment to each new contact and DeFi calls are public.

    Users trust the holder of the auditor key, which can decrypt every user’s history, and the holder of the screener key, which approves deposits. A multisig can upgrade the pool and the contract that owns every shadow account without delay. Leaving needs StarkWare’s sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs., which alone checks proofs and includes pool transactions.

    Architecture

    Each user registers a viewing key, which the pool stores encrypted to the auditor key. Payments travel over channels: the first payment to a contact opens one and names the recipient, later ones only add encrypted notes. A private transfer needs a registered recipient, and registering takes a transaction and fee from the recipient’s own account. A note holds an amount of one token, and spending it publishes a nullifier. DeFi actions use open notes, whose amount a helper contract fills after the swap or loan.

    Flow

    1. Register. The wallet publishes your viewing key, encrypted to the auditor key.
    2. Deposit. The holder of the screener key signs off on your address, and the pool takes the tokens and creates a note. Address, token and amount are public.
    3. Transfer. The wallet proves offchain that you may spend your notes and creates notes for the recipient. A paymaster submits the transaction and takes its fee from your notes.
    4. Withdraw. The pool pays out to any address. Recipient, token and amount are public, and the withdrawing user is encrypted to the auditor key.

    Shadow accounts

    A shadow account is a contract the pool deploys for one user, app and index. The pool withdraws tokens to it, runs the app’s calls through it and moves the results back into the user’s notes. Shadow account addresses derive from the user’s viewing key, so whoever holds that key can find them. The anonymizer owns every shadow account and can move what it holds.

    Keys

    The user’s Starknet account signs every action, and their viewing key decrypts their notes. The app derives the viewing key on the device from a signature of the account key. Registration cannot be changed, so a leaked viewing key exposes the user’s history for good.

    App

    The app is an open-source Chromium extension that Starknet Holdings publishes. By default it talks to Starknet Holdings’ gateway, which forwards note discovery to StarkWare’s discovery service and relayed transactions to AVNU’s paymaster. Starkscan, also run by Starknet Holdings, serves the activity list. The settings point the RPC, discovery service, proverAn entity that generates the cryptographic proof to convince the verifier that the statement is true. In a ZK-Rollup, the prover generates the ZK (validity) proof to submit to the verifier contract. and paymaster elsewhere. A self-run discovery service keeps the viewing key from the gateway. A self-run prover (high hardware requirements) covers transfers and withdrawals, while deposits need a prover with screening credentials.

    Compliance

    Every deposit from a Starknet address needs a fresh signature from the pool’s screener key. The wallet’s prover requests it from a screening service, which checks the address with Elliptic and serves only its credentialed partners. Governance sets a screening policy per helper contract. Five helpers are exempt, among them the CCTP bridgeA message-passing protocol between two blockchains. At its most basic, a token bridge consists of a smart contract which can escrow funds on one side of the bridge, and instruct the release or minting of corresponding assets on the other side, but bridges could also support arbitrary messages. How these instructions are validated is a critical factor in assessing the trust assumptions of a bridge., so USDC bridged in from other chains skips screening. The auditor key is one public key in the pool’s storage. Who holds the screener and auditor private keys is not visible onchain, and governance can replace either key at once.

    Fees

    Every pool transaction pays a fixed STRK fee, which governance can change at any time, plus gasA virtual fuel used to execute smart contracts on a rollup. The EVM (or other VM within the rollup) uses an accounting mechanism to correspond the consumption of gas to the consumption of computing resources, and to limit the consumption of computing resources.. Paymasters take their cost from the user’s notes.

    Anonymity setIn privacy protocols, anonymity set denotes all users, to which a particular withdrawal could be plausibly attributed. Anonymity set depends on a particular withdrawal, the size of the anonymity set is a metric for level of user's privacy.

    One pool holds every token, but each token forms its own set. Registered users are the upper bound.

    What the protocol promises: Hides amounts, senders and the link between deposit and withdrawal inside the pool. The first payment to each new contact is public.

    • Bramblev0.10.7Reference

      The ratings assume this app, since 2026-10-27 · Source d90222a

    • Ready extensionLeaks more

      Sends the account and viewing key to Ready's servers, with no setting for a self-run discovery service.

      Fix: Let users set their own discovery service and prover, as Bramble does. · Source (checked 2026-10-30)

    • Xverse extensionLeaks more

      Its privacy servers refuse Tor, so they get the user's IP along with the account and viewing key.

      Fix: Accept Tor connections on its privacy servers. · Source (checked 2026-10-30)

    • Haven web appLeaks more

      Reads the account's balances and transfers through Cartridge's public RPC, a third party that refuses most Tor circuits.

      Fix: Read the chain through Haven's own servers or a user-set RPC, and accept Tor there. · Source (checked 2026-10-30)

    • OffMarket web appLeaks more

      Reports each deposit, trade and settled position to FullStory, a session recorder that is always on, so FullStory can link them.

      Fix: Remove FullStory from the pages that handle private actions. · Source (checked 2026-10-30)

    Ethereum is public by default. Each protocol is rated on its main privacy promise, like hiding who paid, who received, how much, or which deposit became which withdrawal. Against each adversary, the colour says whether it holds for a careful user with the app's own settings: green yes, yellow only with significant extra work, red no. Fields marked at risk stay private only under the condition in their note.

    Public observerChain analystNetwork observerPrivileged insiderFuture adversary
    Public observer
    At risk

    Transfers inside the pool are encrypted, but the first payment to each new contact writes the recipient’s address in cleartext. Deposits and withdrawals show address, token and amount. DeFi actions name their target contract, and a shadow account shows its funding, calls and positions.

    Advice: Submit every private action through a paymaster. Treat the first payment to a new contact, and any DeFi action, as public.

    InsideSenderprivateRecipientexposedAmountprivateAssetat riskLinkprivate
    Chain analyst
    At risk

    Every token except STRK has fewer than 1,000 depositors to hide among. A channel opened in the same transaction as a deposit ties the two together, and most withdrawal addresses have also deposited. Paying gasA virtual fuel used to execute smart contracts on a rollup. The EVM (or other VM within the rollup) uses an accounting mechanism to correspond the consumption of gas to the consumption of computing resources, and to limit the consumption of computing resources. from the user’s wallet instead of a paymaster exposes its fingerprint, account implementation and fee habits, even from a fresh address.

    Advice: Hold STRK or USDC, open channels in a transaction without a deposit, and withdraw amounts that match no deposit. Wait before exiting and pick a different time of day than the deposit. Exit to a fresh address every time and spend from it with a different wallet than the one that deposited.

    Compared with a public observer
    InsideSenderat riskRecipientexposedAssetat riskLinkat risk
    Network observer
    Private

    Every pool request goes through Starknet Holdings’ gateway, so AVNU and StarkWare’s discovery service see only the gateway. The gateway answers over Tor, and Bramble runs only in Chromium, not in Tor Browser.

    Advice: Run Bramble with all traffic through an IP-hiding route.

    Compared with a public observer
    InsideRecipientexposedAssetat riskLinkat risk
    Privileged insider
    Exposed

    Every user’s viewing key is escrowed onchain, encrypted to one auditor key that a role holder can replace at any time with no delay. Starknet Holdings’ gateway gets the account and viewing key at every unlock, and each proof carries the viewing key. Apps that drive a shadow account or a swap through the pool get the user’s main address from the wallet connection. The holder of the screener key can blockAn ordered list of transactions and chain-related metadata that gets bundled together and published to the L1/DA layer. Nodes execute the transactions contained within blocks to change the rollup chain’s state. Protocol rules dictate what constitutes a valid block, and invalid blocks are skipped over. any screened depositor.

    Compared with a public observer
    InsideSenderexposedRecipientexposedAmountexposedAssetexposedLinkexposed
    Future adversary
    Exposed

    Whoever breaks elliptic-curve cryptography recovers the auditor key from its onchain public key, and with it every escrowed viewing key and the whole history. Channel keys and note contents use the same elliptic-curve encryption. Accounts created from a wallet signature reduce to that wallet’s key.

    Compared with a public observer
    InsideSenderexposedRecipientexposedAmountexposedAssetexposedLinkexposed

    30 day historic anonymity set

    How many unique depositors you could have blended in with if you withdrew on a particular day after depositing during the previous 30 days. This metric is a proxy for the historic anonymity set and shows how it developed over time.

    The metric looks backwards: it counts deposits that already happened, including from addresses that have since withdrawn. Your real anonymity also depends on deposits made after yours, which cannot be known in advance.

    Estimated anonymity set by holding duration

    An estimate of how many unique depositors you blend in with, depending on how long you leave your deposit in the pool. It is based on historic data of past deposits: each point counts depositors from the preceding period, so holding for up to 30 days effectively means blending in with everyone who deposited during the last 30 days.

    Asset
    Deposits 7D
    Deposits 30D
    Deposits Total
    Value Locked
    XSTRKXSTRK
    0
    $0.00
    3
    $8.81 K
    17
    $75.43 K
    $483.58 K
    USDCUSDC
    36
    $15.33 K
    532
    $104.16 K
    6.79 K
    $947.93 K
    $239.99 K
    STRKSTRK
    83
    $23.61 K
    2.84 K
    $442.68 K
    11.98 K
    $1.73 M
    $234.98 K
    WBTCWBTC
    0
    $0.00
    6
    $29.36 K
    81
    $106.43 K
    $55.45 K
    ETHETH
    1
    $25.90
    213
    $12.47 K
    415
    $207.71 K
    $45.86 K
    strkBTCstrkBTC
    3
    $3.44
    12
    $55.89 K
    1.37 K
    $512.82 K
    $16.01 K
    USDTUSDT
    0
    $0.00
    5
    $1.30 K
    16
    $16.45 K
    $11.50 K
    Total
    123
    $38.98 K
    3.61 K
    $654.70 K
    20.68 K
    $3.59 M
    $1.08 M

    Shadow accounts launch

    13 Oct 2026

    StarkWare opens per-app shadow accounts, which let apps act for pool users without naming them.

    Learn more

    Privacy live on Starknet

    9 Jun 2026

    StarkWare opens the pool to users through the Ready and Xverse wallets.

    Learn more

    Funds can be stolen if

    1. the proof systemThe infrastructure that allows projects to verify their state transitions. It is composed by onchain verifiers and offchain provers. The main two flavors are optimistic and ZK proof systems, but they can be combined in a hybrid model. In general though, if a system is able to accept state roots optimistically, even if it has a ZK component, it is considered an optimistic proof system. or virtual Starknet execution model is broken, allowing invalid actions.
    2. the Starknet sequencerA party responsible for ordering and executing transactions on the rollup. The sequencer verifies transactions, compresses the data into a block, and submits the data related to it to enable state reconstruction to Ethereum L1 as a single transaction. The data can be either transaction data or state diffs. includes a transaction with fabricated proof facts.
    3. the 7/12 multisig deploys a malicious upgrade of the pool or of the anonymizer, which owns every shadow account, with no delay.
    4. the 2/4 multisig deploys a malicious upgrade of the pool or of the anonymizer, with a one-day delay.
    5. an external DeFi helper or target protocol invoked by the user mishandles assets.

    Funds can be lost if

    1. a user loses the Starknet account key or viewing key required to spend their notes.
    2. the pool is paused or upgraded so that valid actions fail.

    Privacy can be lost if

    1. the holder of the auditor key decrypts users’ viewing keys, which exposes their whole history (see privileged insider).
    2. the wallet’s proverAn entity that generates the cryptographic proof to convince the verifier that the statement is true. In a ZK-Rollup, the prover generates the ZK (validity) proof to submit to the verifier contract. or note discovery service, which receives the viewing key, leaks or keeps it (see privileged insider).
    3. an app driving a shadow account or a swap through the pool links it to the user’s main address (see privileged insider).
    4. a first payment to a new contact, a channel opened beside a deposit or a unique amount links activity (see public observer and chain analyst).
    5. Bramble sends CoinGecko every privately held token at each balance check, which can single out holders of rare tokens (see networkA constellation of nodes (peers) that communicate via a peer-to-peer protocol, for example, in propagating transactions and blocks to other nodes. observer).
    6. elliptic-curve cryptography is broken, which opens the auditor key and with it every user’s history (see future adversary).

    A 7/12 multisig holds the governance, security and upgrade roles of the pool and the anonymizer, and can replace either’s code at once. A 2/4 multisig owns a delayed executor that can upgrade both behind a one-day delay. The 7/12 and the 2/4 both hold the pool’s app role, which sets the fee, the fee collector, the proof validity window and which DeFi helpers need screening. The security governor role, held by the 7/12, can replace the auditor and screener keys at once. Pausing the pool needs a role nobody holds today, which the 7/12 can grant.

    Transparent setup

    Stwo

    Detailed description

    Transparent proving systems require no trusted setups and have no additional setup-related trust assumptions.