# Syndicate Frame Chain

Markdown version of https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/syndicateframe

## Summary

**Warning:** This project is archived and no longer maintained.

**Warning:** Why is the project listed in others? The proof system isn't fully functional. Consequence: projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds. Learn more about the [recategorisation](https://medium.com/l2beat/framework-update-l2-projects-recategorisation-5d43b0d1fe50).

- Total Value Secured: $9.58 K (-2.10% compared to seven days ago; canonically bridged $9.58 K, natively minted $0.00, externally bridged $0.00; 0.00% with additional trust assumptions compared to the tokens involved and the Stage assigned to the project's canonical messaging bridge)
- TVS by asset: ETH & derivatives $9.58 K (100%)
- Past day UOPS: No data
- Gas token: ETH
- Type: Other
- Purposes: Universal, Social
- Host chain: Base Chain
- Chain ID: 5101
- Risks shown: combined with host chain Base Chain; Risk analysis also lists each separately

### Risks

- Sequencer failure: Self sequence (sentiment: good)
- State validation: None (7d challenge period; sentiment: bad)
- Data availability: Onchain (sentiment: good)
- Exit window: None (sentiment: bad)
- Proposer failure: Cannot withdraw (sentiment: bad)

### About

Syndicate Frame Chain is an OP Stack L3 on Base for Farcaster Frame developers.

### Links

- Website: https://syndicate.io/blog/syndicate-frame-chain
- Bridge: https://bridge-frame.syndicate.io/, https://frame.syndicate.io/
- Docs: https://docs.syndicate.io/docs/core/get-started/introduction
- Explorer: https://explorer-frame.syndicate.io/
- Repository: https://github.com/WillPapper/syndicate-farcaster-frame-starter
- Social: https://warpcast.com/syndicate, https://x.com/syndicateio
- Contracts explorer (Disco): https://disco.ethbeat.org/ui/p/syndicateframe

### Badges

- EVM: This project uses the Ethereum Virtual Machine to run its smart contracts and supports the Solidity programming language
- Ethereum with blobs: This project is posting its data to Ethereum as blobs
- Built on OP Stack: The project is built on the OP Stack
- Built on top of Base: The project has Base as its host chain
- Caldera: This project was deployed via the rollup-as-a-service provider Caldera

## Value Secured

The interactive TVS charts are shown on [the HTML page](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/syndicateframe#tvs).

Token by token: [TVS breakdown](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/syndicateframe/tvs-breakdown).

- [TVS chart (JSON)](https://ethbeat.org/api/scaling/tvs/syndicateframe?range=max)
- [TVS breakdown by token (JSON)](https://ethbeat.org/api/scaling/tvs/syndicateframe/breakdown)

## Activity

The interactive activity chart is shown on [the HTML page](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/syndicateframe#activity).

- [Activity chart (JSON)](https://ethbeat.org/api/scaling/activity/syndicateframe?range=max)

## Risk summary

There are 1 additional risks coming from the host chain [Base Chain](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/base)

**Warning:** Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots.

### Funds can be stolen if

1. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL),
2. an invalid state root is submitted to the system (CRITICAL).

### Funds can be frozen if

3. the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL).

### MEV can be extracted if

4. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

## Risk analysis

The L3 risks depend on the individual properties of L3 and those of the host chain combined.

**Warning:** Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots.

|  | Sequencer failure | State validation | Data availability | Exit window | Proposer failure |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Base Chain (L2) | Self sequence (sentiment: good) | Fraud proofs (1R, ZK) (sentiment: good) | Onchain (sentiment: good) | None (sentiment: bad) | Self propose (sentiment: good) |
| Syndicate Frame Chain (L3, individual) | Self sequence (sentiment: good) | None (sentiment: bad) | Onchain (sentiment: good) | None (sentiment: bad) | Cannot withdraw (sentiment: bad) |
| Syndicate Frame Chain (L3, combined) | Self sequence (sentiment: good) | None (sentiment: bad) | Onchain (sentiment: good) | None (sentiment: bad) | Cannot withdraw (sentiment: bad) |

### L3 combined risks

The information below reflects combined L2 & L3 risks.

#### Sequencer failure

Self sequence (sentiment: good)

In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.

#### State validation

None (7d challenge period; sentiment: bad)

Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.

#### Data availability

Onchain (sentiment: good)

All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.

#### Exit window

None (sentiment: bad)

There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

#### Proposer failure

Cannot withdraw (sentiment: bad)

Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.

## Stage

Syndicate Frame Chain is not even a Stage 0 project.

**The project does not pass the walkaway test**: users are not able to exit in the presence of malicious operators if the Security Council disappears.

**Warning:** The requirement for available node software is under review

### Stage 0

1 issue needs fixing.

- Met: The project calls itself a rollup.
- Met: State roots are posted to Ethereum L1.
- Met: Inputs for the state transition function are posted to Ethereum L1.
- Under review: A source-available node exists that can recreate the state from Ethereum L1 data. Please note that the ETHBEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code.
- Issue: The proof system is still under development.

### Stage 1

3 issues need fixing.

**Principle**

- Issue: Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council should be the only way (other than bugs) for a rollup to indefinitely block an L2→L1 message (e.g. a withdrawal) or push an invalid L2→L1 message (e.g. an invalid withdrawal) with a <7d exit window.

**Guidelines**

- Issue: Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.
- Issue: Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.

### Stage 2

1 issue needs fixing.

- Issue: Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs provide less than 30d to exit.

[Learn more about Stages](https://ethbeat.org/stages).

Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal.

## Data availability

### All data required for proofs is published onchain

All the data that is used to construct the system state is published onchain in the form of cheap calldata. This ensures that it will always be available when needed.

**References**

- [Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission)
- [BatchInbox - address](https://basescan.org/address/0x97395dd253E2d096A0CaA62a574895c3C2F2b2e0#code)
- [OptimismPortal.sol - source code, depositTransaction function](https://basescan.org/address/0x44Ce95273E69246fe258b02a68E3a6FfCA66fdf2#code)

Learn more about the DA layer here: [Ethereum](https://ethbeat.org/projects/ethereum)

## State validation

### No state validation

OP Stack projects can use the OP fault proof system, already being deployed on some. This project though is not using fault proofs yet and is relying on the honesty of the permissioned Proposer and Challengers to ensure state correctness. The smart contract system permits invalid state roots.

**Risks**

- Funds can be stolen if an invalid state root is submitted to the system (CRITICAL).

**References**

- [L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, deleteL2Outputs function](https://basescan.org/address/0x6042DE5a64709d8d4bBb227891AD886ECff49c6d#code)

## Upgrades & Governance

### Past upgrades

The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included.

- Count of upgrades: 1
- Last upgrade: 2y 9mo ago
- Avg upgrade interval: 1y 4mo

- 2024-02-08 05:18 UTC, deployment of [OptimismPortal](https://basescan.org/address/0x52fA397D799f1CE416a2089B964Aa293c347994F#code): transaction [0x7365eb094277a0147c55d12fe495f56b4c4297ea9aa6672b3e3c7845b4b0d88d](https://basescan.org/tx/0x7365eb094277a0147c55d12fe495f56b4c4297ea9aa6672b3e3c7845b4b0d88d), implementations: [0x44Ce95273E69246fe258b02a68E3a6FfCA66fdf2](https://basescan.org/address/0x44Ce95273E69246fe258b02a68E3a6FfCA66fdf2#code)
- 2024-02-08 05:18 UTC, deployment of [L2OutputOracle](https://basescan.org/address/0x520D972B4A7C1CE4d5e01bCd4349a93a8AeaEAC5#code): transaction [0xaf623829a347e0ac10b6be166c1c32a64bb61fc9866d9bc1fcbfad71e6803107](https://basescan.org/tx/0xaf623829a347e0ac10b6be166c1c32a64bb61fc9866d9bc1fcbfad71e6803107), implementations: [0x6042DE5a64709d8d4bBb227891AD886ECff49c6d](https://basescan.org/address/0x6042DE5a64709d8d4bBb227891AD886ECff49c6d#code)
- 2024-02-08 05:17 UTC, upgrade of [L1CrossDomainMessenger](https://basescan.org/address/0x0ED44be59Ea62a9960CB97f8aC54088304D05791#code): transaction [0x64273f6d08fd5de9b9d3480c7d387e64b13c3364e227601a6af78c5a49057427](https://basescan.org/tx/0x64273f6d08fd5de9b9d3480c7d387e64b13c3364e227601a6af78c5a49057427), implementations: [0x06DDDA853506cECa671a06136f955f7f042FD667](https://basescan.org/address/0x06DDDA853506cECa671a06136f955f7f042FD667#code) ([diff](https://disco.ethbeat.org/diff/base:0x0ED44be59Ea62a9960CB97f8aC54088304D05791/base:0x06DDDA853506cECa671a06136f955f7f042FD667))
- 2024-02-08 05:17 UTC, deployment of [SystemConfig](https://basescan.org/address/0xc2dA6Afd69F0ce69313F01c73f77E6471f06b4E4#code): transaction [0x31c3e3a0a7efc91fa8eec9137a7d19fe4ab6ed13e92c9cd4cbf28f5ea10a6154](https://basescan.org/tx/0x31c3e3a0a7efc91fa8eec9137a7d19fe4ab6ed13e92c9cd4cbf28f5ea10a6154), implementations: [0x5581A42BAF9bd77e1c56aFB2c74dEF20dfe26f9A](https://basescan.org/address/0x5581A42BAF9bd77e1c56aFB2c74dEF20dfe26f9A#code)
- 2024-02-08 05:15 UTC, deployment of [L1CrossDomainMessenger](https://basescan.org/address/0x0ED44be59Ea62a9960CB97f8aC54088304D05791#code): transaction [0x2eea12a1949fd31d0b78093777274d93d22abbfe7f8c3a146336baf9d413037d](https://basescan.org/tx/0x2eea12a1949fd31d0b78093777274d93d22abbfe7f8c3a146336baf9d413037d), implementations: [0x0ED44be59Ea62a9960CB97f8aC54088304D05791](https://basescan.org/address/0x0ED44be59Ea62a9960CB97f8aC54088304D05791#code)

## Updates

Each date links the update on the HTML page, which also shows its contract diffs.

### [2025-11-21 12:38 UTC](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/syndicateframe?update=8927484d) (1 change)

Posting calldata to host chain rather than Celestia commitment.

### [2025-09-26 08:35 UTC](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/syndicateframe?update=222fe6cb) (2 changes)

Caldera multisig threshold change.

### [2025-09-12 07:17 UTC](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/syndicateframe?update=2a7457e3) (4 changes)

multisig change.

### [2025-07-14 12:44 UTC](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/syndicateframe?update=1e19dac7) (8 changes)

Discovery rerun on the same block number with only config-related changes.

### [2025-05-08 09:52 UTC](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/syndicateframe?update=fd5c9457) (1 change)

celestia

### [2024-11-18 17:16 UTC](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/syndicateframe?update=bbc2906a) (3 changes)

Signer changes at Caldera.

### [2024-08-20 07:29 UTC](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/syndicateframe?update=9247b579) (8 changes)

The proxy admin was updated to a 3/4 multisig (not sure why the updates below).

### [2024-04-17 07:59 UTC](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/syndicateframe?update=1c213e1d) (7 changes)

Standard OP stack chain with no significant changes.

## Operator

The section considers only the L3 properties. For more details please refer to [Base Chain](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/base)

### The system has a centralized operator

The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.

**Risks**

- MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

**References**

- [L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, CHALLENGER address](https://basescan.org/address/0x6042DE5a64709d8d4bBb227891AD886ECff49c6d#code)
- [L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, PROPOSER address](https://basescan.org/address/0x6042DE5a64709d8d4bBb227891AD886ECff49c6d#code)

### Users can force any transaction

Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.

**References**

- [Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window)
- [OptimismPortal.sol - source code, depositTransaction function](https://basescan.org/address/0x44Ce95273E69246fe258b02a68E3a6FfCA66fdf2#code)

## Withdrawals

The section considers only the L3 properties. For more details please refer to [Base Chain](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/base)

### Regular messaging

The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization takes a challenge period of 7d to complete.

**Risks**

- Funds can be frozen if the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production (CRITICAL).

**References**

- [OptimismPortal.sol - source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function](https://basescan.org/address/0x44Ce95273E69246fe258b02a68E3a6FfCA66fdf2#code)
- [OptimismPortal.sol - source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function](https://basescan.org/address/0x44Ce95273E69246fe258b02a68E3a6FfCA66fdf2#code)
- [L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, PROPOSER check](https://basescan.org/address/0x6042DE5a64709d8d4bBb227891AD886ECff49c6d#code)

### Forced messaging

If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.

**References**

- [Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain](https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction)

## Other considerations

### EVM compatible smart contracts are supported

OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.

**References**

- [Introducing EVM Equivalence](https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306)

## Permissions

Explore these contracts and permissions in Disco, ETHBEAT's contract explorer: https://disco.ethbeat.org/ui/p/syndicateframe

### Base Chain

#### Actors

##### Caldera Multisig 2

Addresses: [0x87Ef0aB1189F76eBCaEe736A5EB8F639a8cF156d](https://basescan.org/address/0x87Ef0aB1189F76eBCaEe736A5EB8F639a8cF156d)

A Multisig with 2/6 threshold.
- Can upgrade **with no delay**
  - L1CrossDomainMessenger [via: ProxyAdmin]
  - L2OutputOracle [via: ProxyAdmin]
  - OptimismPortal [via: ProxyAdmin]
  - SystemConfig [via: ProxyAdmin]
  - L1StandardBridge [via: ProxyAdmin]
- Can interact with AddressManager
  - set and change address mappings [via: ProxyAdmin]

Participants (6): [0x9e14B1baFCEB80B67934aBE4fB00a7291aCfBcD0](https://basescan.org/address/0x9e14B1baFCEB80B67934aBE4fB00a7291aCfBcD0), [0x2F2d46D3dD36c8d1ae2Cb81c0cD2c05C68DBA675](https://basescan.org/address/0x2F2d46D3dD36c8d1ae2Cb81c0cD2c05C68DBA675), [0xe62a4A1e6D237d6fc40d88F819D5cE580a996A6b](https://basescan.org/address/0xe62a4A1e6D237d6fc40d88F819D5cE580a996A6b), [0xc4548687682246e5B6ee8f914635c9f47836eDFe](https://basescan.org/address/0xc4548687682246e5B6ee8f914635c9f47836eDFe), [0x356000Cec4fC967f8FC372381D983426760A0391](https://basescan.org/address/0x356000Cec4fC967f8FC372381D983426760A0391) (Caldera), [0x12ee26aD74d50a1f6BDD90811387d1e0f3e7C76A](https://basescan.org/address/0x12ee26aD74d50a1f6BDD90811387d1e0f3e7C76A)

##### EOA 1

Addresses: [0xdC545dDC657A1E2EDA8F6cBBE382927E3C9aA6E4](https://basescan.org/address/0xdC545dDC657A1E2EDA8F6cBBE382927E3C9aA6E4)

- Can interact with L2OutputOracle
  - Allowed to challenge or delete state roots proposed by a Proposer
- Can interact with OptimismPortal
  - Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless)
- Can interact with SystemConfig
  - it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system

##### EOA 2

Addresses: [0x63d02F40A14c54283D5Dc3451d3Ed4DC134833e5](https://basescan.org/address/0x63d02F40A14c54283D5Dc3451d3Ed4DC134833e5)

- Can interact with SystemConfig
  - Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain

##### EOA 3

Addresses: [0xADE1F8C181934052fD1958F06B63Ef0D875803C5](https://basescan.org/address/0xADE1F8C181934052fD1958F06B63Ef0D875803C5)

- Can interact with L2OutputOracle
  - Allowed to post new state roots of the current layer to the host chain

## Smart contracts

![A diagram of the smart contract architecture](https://ethbeat.org/static/images/architecture/opstack-rollup.edf5ae96.png)

Explore these contracts and permissions in Disco, ETHBEAT's contract explorer: https://disco.ethbeat.org/ui/p/syndicateframe

### Base Chain

#### L2OutputOracle

Addresses: [0x520D972B4A7C1CE4d5e01bCd4349a93a8AeaEAC5](https://basescan.org/address/0x520D972B4A7C1CE4d5e01bCd4349a93a8AeaEAC5#code), [0x6042DE5a64709d8d4bBb227891AD886ECff49c6d](https://basescan.org/address/0x6042DE5a64709d8d4bBb227891AD886ECff49c6d#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xF5BD775557F3b8817C34Fc784971A0AF1a36DD8E](https://basescan.org/address/0xF5BD775557F3b8817C34Fc784971A0AF1a36DD8E#code) (Admin)

**Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: No upgrades, Last upgrade: N/A, Avg upgrade interval: N/A)

- 2024-02-08 05:18 UTC, deployment of [L2OutputOracle](https://basescan.org/address/0x520D972B4A7C1CE4d5e01bCd4349a93a8AeaEAC5#code): transaction [0xaf623829a347e0ac10b6be166c1c32a64bb61fc9866d9bc1fcbfad71e6803107](https://basescan.org/tx/0xaf623829a347e0ac10b6be166c1c32a64bb61fc9866d9bc1fcbfad71e6803107), implementations: [0x6042DE5a64709d8d4bBb227891AD886ECff49c6d](https://basescan.org/address/0x6042DE5a64709d8d4bBb227891AD886ECff49c6d#code)

Contains a list of proposed state roots which Proposers assert to be a result of block execution. Currently only the PROPOSER address can submit new state roots.
- Roles:
  - **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Caldera Multisig 2
  - **challenger**: EOA 1
  - **proposer**: EOA 3

Can be upgraded by: Caldera Multisig 2 with no delay

#### OptimismPortal (escrow)

Addresses: [0x52fA397D799f1CE416a2089B964Aa293c347994F](https://basescan.org/address/0x52fA397D799f1CE416a2089B964Aa293c347994F#code), [0x44Ce95273E69246fe258b02a68E3a6FfCA66fdf2](https://basescan.org/address/0x44Ce95273E69246fe258b02a68E3a6FfCA66fdf2#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xF5BD775557F3b8817C34Fc784971A0AF1a36DD8E](https://basescan.org/address/0xF5BD775557F3b8817C34Fc784971A0AF1a36DD8E#code) (Admin)

**Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: No upgrades, Last upgrade: N/A, Avg upgrade interval: N/A)

- 2024-02-08 05:18 UTC, deployment of [OptimismPortal](https://basescan.org/address/0x52fA397D799f1CE416a2089B964Aa293c347994F#code): transaction [0x7365eb094277a0147c55d12fe495f56b4c4297ea9aa6672b3e3c7845b4b0d88d](https://basescan.org/tx/0x7365eb094277a0147c55d12fe495f56b4c4297ea9aa6672b3e3c7845b4b0d88d), implementations: [0x44Ce95273E69246fe258b02a68E3a6FfCA66fdf2](https://basescan.org/address/0x44Ce95273E69246fe258b02a68E3a6FfCA66fdf2#code)

The main entry point to deposit funds from host chain to this chain. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals.
- Roles:
  - **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Caldera Multisig 2
  - **guardian**: EOA 1

The following tokens are included in the value secured calculation: ETH

Can be upgraded by: Caldera Multisig 2 with no delay

#### SystemConfig

Addresses: [0xc2dA6Afd69F0ce69313F01c73f77E6471f06b4E4](https://basescan.org/address/0xc2dA6Afd69F0ce69313F01c73f77E6471f06b4E4#code), [0x5581A42BAF9bd77e1c56aFB2c74dEF20dfe26f9A](https://basescan.org/address/0x5581A42BAF9bd77e1c56aFB2c74dEF20dfe26f9A#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xF5BD775557F3b8817C34Fc784971A0AF1a36DD8E](https://basescan.org/address/0xF5BD775557F3b8817C34Fc784971A0AF1a36DD8E#code) (Admin)

**Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: No upgrades, Last upgrade: N/A, Avg upgrade interval: N/A)

- 2024-02-08 05:17 UTC, deployment of [SystemConfig](https://basescan.org/address/0xc2dA6Afd69F0ce69313F01c73f77E6471f06b4E4#code): transaction [0x31c3e3a0a7efc91fa8eec9137a7d19fe4ab6ed13e92c9cd4cbf28f5ea10a6154](https://basescan.org/tx/0x31c3e3a0a7efc91fa8eec9137a7d19fe4ab6ed13e92c9cd4cbf28f5ea10a6154), implementations: [0x5581A42BAF9bd77e1c56aFB2c74dEF20dfe26f9A](https://basescan.org/address/0x5581A42BAF9bd77e1c56aFB2c74dEF20dfe26f9A#code)

Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.
- Roles:
  - **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Caldera Multisig 2
  - **batcherHash**: EOA 2
  - **owner**: EOA 1

Can be upgraded by: Caldera Multisig 2 with no delay

#### L1CrossDomainMessenger

Addresses: [0x0ED44be59Ea62a9960CB97f8aC54088304D05791](https://basescan.org/address/0x0ED44be59Ea62a9960CB97f8aC54088304D05791#code), [0x06DDDA853506cECa671a06136f955f7f042FD667](https://basescan.org/address/0x06DDDA853506cECa671a06136f955f7f042FD667#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xF5BD775557F3b8817C34Fc784971A0AF1a36DD8E](https://basescan.org/address/0xF5BD775557F3b8817C34Fc784971A0AF1a36DD8E#code) (Admin)

**Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: 1, Last upgrade: 2y 9mo ago, Avg upgrade interval: 1y 4mo)

- 2024-02-08 05:17 UTC, upgrade of [L1CrossDomainMessenger](https://basescan.org/address/0x0ED44be59Ea62a9960CB97f8aC54088304D05791#code): transaction [0x64273f6d08fd5de9b9d3480c7d387e64b13c3364e227601a6af78c5a49057427](https://basescan.org/tx/0x64273f6d08fd5de9b9d3480c7d387e64b13c3364e227601a6af78c5a49057427), implementations: [0x06DDDA853506cECa671a06136f955f7f042FD667](https://basescan.org/address/0x06DDDA853506cECa671a06136f955f7f042FD667#code) ([diff](https://disco.ethbeat.org/diff/base:0x0ED44be59Ea62a9960CB97f8aC54088304D05791/base:0x06DDDA853506cECa671a06136f955f7f042FD667))
- 2024-02-08 05:15 UTC, deployment of [L1CrossDomainMessenger](https://basescan.org/address/0x0ED44be59Ea62a9960CB97f8aC54088304D05791#code): transaction [0x2eea12a1949fd31d0b78093777274d93d22abbfe7f8c3a146336baf9d413037d](https://basescan.org/tx/0x2eea12a1949fd31d0b78093777274d93d22abbfe7f8c3a146336baf9d413037d), implementations: [0x0ED44be59Ea62a9960CB97f8aC54088304D05791](https://basescan.org/address/0x0ED44be59Ea62a9960CB97f8aC54088304D05791#code)

Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function.
- Roles:
  - **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Caldera Multisig 2

Can be upgraded by: Caldera Multisig 2 with no delay

#### L1StandardBridge (escrow)

Addresses: [0xF7Cb313CB6D146dAbB8c5E31798BDCeFc67B831b](https://basescan.org/address/0xF7Cb313CB6D146dAbB8c5E31798BDCeFc67B831b#code), [0xFF505c0Eb62C37901F53cCBf2973AAe75D26d0AE](https://basescan.org/address/0xFF505c0Eb62C37901F53cCBf2973AAe75D26d0AE#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xF5BD775557F3b8817C34Fc784971A0AF1a36DD8E](https://basescan.org/address/0xF5BD775557F3b8817C34Fc784971A0AF1a36DD8E#code) (Admin)

The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.
- Roles:
  - **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Caldera Multisig 2

All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation.

Can be upgraded by: Caldera Multisig 2 with no delay

#### ProxyAdmin

Addresses: [0xF5BD775557F3b8817C34Fc784971A0AF1a36DD8E](https://basescan.org/address/0xF5BD775557F3b8817C34Fc784971A0AF1a36DD8E#code)

- Roles:
  - **owner**: Caldera Multisig 2

The current deployment carries some associated risks:

- Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).