# Immutable zkEVM Markdown version of https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/immutablezkevm ## Summary **Warning:** Why is the project listed in others? The proof system isn't fully functional. Consequence: projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds. There is no data availability bridge. Consequence: projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds. Learn more about the [recategorisation](https://medium.com/l2beat/framework-update-l2-projects-recategorisation-5d43b0d1fe50). - Total Value Secured: $23.09 M (-4.33% compared to seven days ago; canonically bridged $23.08 M, natively minted $11.43 K, externally bridged $0.00; 0.00% with additional trust assumptions compared to the tokens involved and the Stage assigned to the project's canonical messaging bridge) - **Warning:** The IMX token associated with Immutable zkEVM accounts for 41.3% of the TVS! (sentiment: warning) - TVS by asset: ETH & derivatives $10.64 M (46.1%), Stablecoins $2.51 M (10.8%), Other $9.93 M (43.0%) - Associated tokens: IMX: $9.55 M (41.3% of TVS) - Past day UOPS: 0.47 (-5.42% compared to seven days ago) - Type: Other - Purpose: Universal - Host chain: Ethereum - Chain ID: 13371 ### Risks - Sequencer failure: No mechanism (sentiment: bad) - State validation: None (1d challenge period; sentiment: bad) - Data availability: External (sentiment: bad) - Exit window: None (sentiment: bad) - Proposer failure: Cannot withdraw (sentiment: bad) ### About Immutable zkEVM is a sidechain focused on gaming and powered by the Polygon stack. It plans to eventually transition to a ZK Rollup. ### Links - Website: https://immutable.com/chain - Docs: https://docs.x.immutable.com/docs/zkEVM/overview - Explorer: https://explorer.immutable.com/ - Social: https://twitter.com/Immutable, https://discord.com/invite/immutable-play, https://reddit.com/r/ImmutableX/, https://instagram.com/lifeatimmutable/, https://linkedin.com/company/immutable-1/, https://youtube.com/channel/UCR_WlrGou7hm0ACXYpldcuA - Contracts explorer (Disco): https://disco.ethbeat.org/ui/p/immutablezkevm ### Badges - EVM: This project uses the Ethereum Virtual Machine to run its smart contracts and supports the Solidity programming language - Custom DA solution: This project is using a custom DA solution ## Value Secured The interactive TVS charts are shown on [the HTML page](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/immutablezkevm#tvs). Token by token: [TVS breakdown](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/immutablezkevm/tvs-breakdown). - [TVS chart (JSON)](https://ethbeat.org/api/scaling/tvs/immutablezkevm) - [TVS breakdown by token (JSON)](https://ethbeat.org/api/scaling/tvs/immutablezkevm/breakdown) ## Activity The interactive activity chart is shown on [the HTML page](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/immutablezkevm#activity). - [Activity chart (JSON)](https://ethbeat.org/api/scaling/activity/immutablezkevm) ## Risk summary ### Funds can be stolen if 1. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL), 2. validators decide to mint more tokens than there are locked on Ethereum thus preventing some existing holders from being able to bring their funds back to Ethereum, 3. validators relay a withdraw request that wasn't originated on the source chain. ### Users can be censored if 4. validators on Axelar decide to not mint tokens after observing an event on Ethereum. ## Risk analysis ### Sequencer failure No mechanism (sentiment: bad) There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. ### State validation None (1d challenge period; sentiment: bad) Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview. ### Data availability External (sentiment: bad) Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain. ### Exit window None (sentiment: bad) There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. ### Proposer failure Cannot withdraw (sentiment: bad) Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. ## State validation ### No state validation Immutable zkEVM bridge makes use of Axelar network (a Cosmos chain) to transfer assets between Ethereum and Immutable zkEVM. As in any standard Cosmos chain, validators are bonded by staking tokens and can be slashed by social consensus for misbehaviour. A deposit starts by a user depositing tokens on the Bridge contract and then the tokens are minted on the destination chain. Withdrawals to Ethereum can be delayed by a predefined time with a flow rate mechanism that controls outflows of the bridge escrow. The ProxyAdmin or an address with the rate_control role can define so-called buckets for each token: Each bucket has a capacity and a refill rate. All withdrawals that exceed the tokens bucket capacity trigger the withdrawal queue, which delays subsequent withdrawals of *any* of the bridges' assets for a time defined in withdrawalDelay (currently 1d). **Risks** - Users can be censored if validators on Axelar decide to not mint tokens after observing an event on Ethereum. - Funds can be stolen if validators decide to mint more tokens than there are locked on Ethereum thus preventing some existing holders from being able to bring their funds back to Ethereum. - Funds can be stolen if validators relay a withdraw request that wasn't originated on the source chain. ## Upgrades & Governance ### Past upgrades The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included. - Count of upgrades: No upgrades - Last upgrade: N/A - Avg upgrade interval: N/A - 2023-12-19 05:10 UTC, deployment of [RootAxelarBridgeAdaptor](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4f49B53928A71E553bB1B0F66a5BcB54Fd4E8932#code): transaction [0x39c068494cbb3daa564a918bda53218f86d781976e6a8235c1c89a03dc9ec182](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x39c068494cbb3daa564a918bda53218f86d781976e6a8235c1c89a03dc9ec182), implementations: [0xE2E91C1Ae2873720C3b975a8034e887A35323345](https://etherscan.io/address/0xE2E91C1Ae2873720C3b975a8034e887A35323345#code) - 2023-12-19 05:09 UTC, deployment of [Bridge](https://etherscan.io/address/0xBa5E35E26Ae59c7aea6F029B68c6460De2d13eB6#code): transaction [0x2e14d2e7f495b17f93c4c839315cfedfd5ee28df540e6433ccc6abb0206b0775](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x2e14d2e7f495b17f93c4c839315cfedfd5ee28df540e6433ccc6abb0206b0775), implementations: [0x177EaFe0f1F3359375B1728dae0530a75C83E154](https://etherscan.io/address/0x177EaFe0f1F3359375B1728dae0530a75C83E154#code) ## Updates Each date links the update on the HTML page, which also shows its contract diffs. ### [2026-03-04 09:00 UTC](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/immutablezkevm?update=0c24ebee) (1 change) ms member change. ### [2025-07-14 12:45 UTC](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/immutablezkevm?update=a474a56f) (6 changes) Discovery rerun on the same block number with only config-related changes. ### [2025-03-07 13:49 UTC](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/immutablezkevm?update=8ada3775) (1 change) MS: single member change. ### [2024-10-16 09:51 UTC](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/immutablezkevm?update=6dd1a410) (1 change) Signer change. ### [2024-09-06 11:30 UTC](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/immutablezkevm?update=2676d3b8) (6 changes) One signer removed. ### [2024-08-09 12:46 UTC](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/immutablezkevm?update=80ff9f8f) (9 changes) Two new members added to OwnerMultisig and threshold changed to 4. ### [2024-03-18 07:41 UTC](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/immutablezkevm?update=03a24107) (1 change) Withdrawal queue disabled. The queue gets triggered more and more often by 'large' withdrawals. ### [2024-03-15 10:53 UTC](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/immutablezkevm?update=ab705190) (1 change) Will be active for 24h for all withdrawals. ### [2024-02-07 10:24 UTC](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/immutablezkevm?update=873c2451) (8 changes) Update discovery to include the multisig threshold. ## Permissions Explore these contracts and permissions in Disco, ETHBEAT's contract explorer: https://disco.ethbeat.org/ui/p/immutablezkevm ### Ethereum #### Actors ##### OwnerMultisig Addresses: [0xD2C37fC6fD89563187f3679304975655e448D192](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD2C37fC6fD89563187f3679304975655e448D192) A Multisig with 4/6 threshold. Multisig controlling the ProxyAdmin, potentially stealing all locked funds. Participants (6): [0x37AC4a9Bf184aa1130016525631f3Daec11f7b26](https://etherscan.io/address/0x37AC4a9Bf184aa1130016525631f3Daec11f7b26), [0x3d395f623D8954d71132F5caC10778CA275806e0](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3d395f623D8954d71132F5caC10778CA275806e0), [0xdb6c271060571A96A62E3947E373395C89f765Ba](https://etherscan.io/address/0xdb6c271060571A96A62E3947E373395C89f765Ba), [0xA28A84676E3Cec39e6F1D06CD0EEF6cAAa2F7f7b](https://etherscan.io/address/0xA28A84676E3Cec39e6F1D06CD0EEF6cAAa2F7f7b), [0x296A19A4e87F5824DBE8DEd53415A4704538bB30](https://etherscan.io/address/0x296A19A4e87F5824DBE8DEd53415A4704538bB30), [0x94e97260182B9537822687Dd3c301225c6f87a5e](https://etherscan.io/address/0x94e97260182B9537822687Dd3c301225c6f87a5e) ##### ProxyAdmin Addresses: [0xdE2BCd3F0297d29c25e83228E5A33C0b43b51Ec8](https://etherscan.io/address/0xdE2BCd3F0297d29c25e83228E5A33C0b43b51Ec8) Contract allowed to upgrade the Bridge, its flow rate control and the Axelar adaptor. ## Smart contracts ![A diagram of the smart contract architecture](https://ethbeat.org/static/images/architecture/immutablezkevm.f9c5d409.png) Explore these contracts and permissions in Disco, ETHBEAT's contract explorer: https://disco.ethbeat.org/ui/p/immutablezkevm ### Ethereum #### Bridge Addresses: [0xBa5E35E26Ae59c7aea6F029B68c6460De2d13eB6](https://etherscan.io/address/0xBa5E35E26Ae59c7aea6F029B68c6460De2d13eB6#code), [0x177EaFe0f1F3359375B1728dae0530a75C83E154](https://etherscan.io/address/0x177EaFe0f1F3359375B1728dae0530a75C83E154#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xdE2BCd3F0297d29c25e83228E5A33C0b43b51Ec8](https://etherscan.io/address/0xdE2BCd3F0297d29c25e83228E5A33C0b43b51Ec8#code) (Admin) **Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: No upgrades, Last upgrade: N/A, Avg upgrade interval: N/A) - 2023-12-19 05:09 UTC, deployment of [Bridge](https://etherscan.io/address/0xBa5E35E26Ae59c7aea6F029B68c6460De2d13eB6#code): transaction [0x2e14d2e7f495b17f93c4c839315cfedfd5ee28df540e6433ccc6abb0206b0775](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x2e14d2e7f495b17f93c4c839315cfedfd5ee28df540e6433ccc6abb0206b0775), implementations: [0x177EaFe0f1F3359375B1728dae0530a75C83E154](https://etherscan.io/address/0x177EaFe0f1F3359375B1728dae0530a75C83E154#code) Main escrow for tokens. Can be upgraded by: ProxyAdmin with no delay #### RootAxelarBridgeAdaptor Addresses: [0x4f49B53928A71E553bB1B0F66a5BcB54Fd4E8932](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4f49B53928A71E553bB1B0F66a5BcB54Fd4E8932#code), [0xE2E91C1Ae2873720C3b975a8034e887A35323345](https://etherscan.io/address/0xE2E91C1Ae2873720C3b975a8034e887A35323345#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xdE2BCd3F0297d29c25e83228E5A33C0b43b51Ec8](https://etherscan.io/address/0xdE2BCd3F0297d29c25e83228E5A33C0b43b51Ec8#code) (Admin) **Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: No upgrades, Last upgrade: N/A, Avg upgrade interval: N/A) - 2023-12-19 05:10 UTC, deployment of [RootAxelarBridgeAdaptor](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4f49B53928A71E553bB1B0F66a5BcB54Fd4E8932#code): transaction [0x39c068494cbb3daa564a918bda53218f86d781976e6a8235c1c89a03dc9ec182](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x39c068494cbb3daa564a918bda53218f86d781976e6a8235c1c89a03dc9ec182), implementations: [0xE2E91C1Ae2873720C3b975a8034e887A35323345](https://etherscan.io/address/0xE2E91C1Ae2873720C3b975a8034e887A35323345#code) Axelar adaptor contract used by the bridge. Can be upgraded by: ProxyAdmin with no delay The current deployment carries some associated risks: - Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).