# Derive V3 Markdown version of https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3 ## Summary **Warning:** Why is the project listed in others? There is no data availability bridge. Consequence: projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds. Learn more about the [recategorisation](https://medium.com/l2beat/framework-update-l2-projects-recategorisation-5d43b0d1fe50). - Total Value Secured: $90.13 M (-7.54% compared to seven days ago; canonically bridged $90.13 M, natively minted $0.00, externally bridged $0.00; 0.00% with additional trust assumptions compared to the tokens involved and the Stage assigned to the project's canonical messaging bridge) - TVS by asset: ETH & derivatives $26.96 M (29.9%), Stablecoins $38.33 M (42.5%), BTC & derivatives $23.48 M (26.0%), Other $495.15 K (0.54%), Public RWAs $856.84 K (0.95%) - Past day UOPS: No data - Type: Other - Purpose: Exchange - Host chain: Ethereum ### Risks - Sequencer failure: Enqueue via L1 (sentiment: warning) - State validation: Validity proofs (SN) (No execution delay; sentiment: good) - Data availability: External (sentiment: bad) - Exit window: None (sentiment: bad) - Proposer failure: Cannot withdraw (sentiment: bad) ### About Derive V3 is an options, perpetuals and spot exchange with offchain matching, whose margin and settlement logic runs in an SP1 zkVM program. Batches are proven to Ethereum and their data is posted to Celestia. ### Links - Website: https://derive.xyz/ - Bridge: https://app.derive.xyz/ - Docs: https://docs.derive.xyz/ - Repository: https://github.com/derivexyz - Social: https://x.com/derivexyz, https://discord.gg/Derive, https://t.me/Derive_Announcements - Contracts explorer (Disco): https://disco.ethbeat.org/ui/p/derivev3 ### Badges - Application-specific chain: This project is built to operate a specific application - Celestia: This project is posting its data to Celestia ## Value secured The interactive TVS charts are shown on [the HTML page](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3#tvs). Token by token: [TVS breakdown](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3/tvs-breakdown). - [TVS chart (JSON)](https://ethbeat.org/api/scaling/tvs/derivev3) - [TVS breakdown by token (JSON)](https://ethbeat.org/api/scaling/tvs/derivev3/breakdown) ## Onchain costs The section shows the operating costs that L2s pay to Ethereum. The interactive costs chart is shown on [the HTML page](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3#onchain-costs). ### Tracked transactions #### Proof submissions - functionCall: 2026-10-06 18:33 UTC - now; currently used; address: [0xd330145C17fB6EF2a21ACf1275Ce683A305F58BB](https://etherscan.io/address/0xd330145C17fB6EF2a21ACf1275Ce683A305F58BB); selector: 0xcaf85453; signature: `function submitBatch(bytes32 oldRoot, bytes32 newRoot, uint128 oldPublicAccIndex, uint128 newPublicAccIndex, uint128 oldAdminAccIndex, uint128 newAdminAccIndex, (bytes32 oldPublic, bytes32 newPublic, bytes32 oldAdmin, bytes32 newAdmin) submittedAccs, bytes32 withdrawalDigest, uint64 minOpTimestamp, uint64 maxOpTimestamp, (uint64 prevHeight, bytes32 prevHash, uint64 newHeight, bytes32 newHash, bytes32 prevLastCommitment, bytes32 newLastCommitment, uint64 oldestHeaderTime) da, (uint8 source, uint64 nonceOrActionId, uint64 accountId, address asset, address recipient, uint128 amount)[] withdrawals, bytes proofBytes)` #### State updates - functionCall: 2026-10-06 18:33 UTC - now; currently used; address: [0xd330145C17fB6EF2a21ACf1275Ce683A305F58BB](https://etherscan.io/address/0xd330145C17fB6EF2a21ACf1275Ce683A305F58BB); selector: 0xcaf85453; signature: `function submitBatch(bytes32 oldRoot, bytes32 newRoot, uint128 oldPublicAccIndex, uint128 newPublicAccIndex, uint128 oldAdminAccIndex, uint128 newAdminAccIndex, (bytes32 oldPublic, bytes32 newPublic, bytes32 oldAdmin, bytes32 newAdmin) submittedAccs, bytes32 withdrawalDigest, uint64 minOpTimestamp, uint64 maxOpTimestamp, (uint64 prevHeight, bytes32 prevHash, uint64 newHeight, bytes32 newHash, bytes32 prevLastCommitment, bytes32 newLastCommitment, uint64 oldestHeaderTime) da, (uint8 source, uint64 nonceOrActionId, uint64 accountId, address asset, address recipient, uint128 amount)[] withdrawals, bytes proofBytes)` ## Liveness This section shows how "live" the project's operators are by displaying how frequently they submit transactions of the selected type. It also highlights anomalies — significant deviations from their typical schedule. No ongoing anomalies detected. The interactive liveness chart is shown on [the HTML page](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3#liveness). ### Tracked transactions #### Proof submissions - functionCall: 2026-10-06 18:33 UTC - now; currently used; address: [0xd330145C17fB6EF2a21ACf1275Ce683A305F58BB](https://etherscan.io/address/0xd330145C17fB6EF2a21ACf1275Ce683A305F58BB); selector: 0xcaf85453; signature: `function submitBatch(bytes32 oldRoot, bytes32 newRoot, uint128 oldPublicAccIndex, uint128 newPublicAccIndex, uint128 oldAdminAccIndex, uint128 newAdminAccIndex, (bytes32 oldPublic, bytes32 newPublic, bytes32 oldAdmin, bytes32 newAdmin) submittedAccs, bytes32 withdrawalDigest, uint64 minOpTimestamp, uint64 maxOpTimestamp, (uint64 prevHeight, bytes32 prevHash, uint64 newHeight, bytes32 newHash, bytes32 prevLastCommitment, bytes32 newLastCommitment, uint64 oldestHeaderTime) da, (uint8 source, uint64 nonceOrActionId, uint64 accountId, address asset, address recipient, uint128 amount)[] withdrawals, bytes proofBytes)` #### State updates - functionCall: 2026-10-06 18:33 UTC - now; currently used; address: [0xd330145C17fB6EF2a21ACf1275Ce683A305F58BB](https://etherscan.io/address/0xd330145C17fB6EF2a21ACf1275Ce683A305F58BB); selector: 0xcaf85453; signature: `function submitBatch(bytes32 oldRoot, bytes32 newRoot, uint128 oldPublicAccIndex, uint128 newPublicAccIndex, uint128 oldAdminAccIndex, uint128 newAdminAccIndex, (bytes32 oldPublic, bytes32 newPublic, bytes32 oldAdmin, bytes32 newAdmin) submittedAccs, bytes32 withdrawalDigest, uint64 minOpTimestamp, uint64 maxOpTimestamp, (uint64 prevHeight, bytes32 prevHash, uint64 newHeight, bytes32 newHash, bytes32 prevLastCommitment, bytes32 newLastCommitment, uint64 oldestHeaderTime) da, (uint8 source, uint64 nonceOrActionId, uint64 accountId, address asset, address recipient, uint128 amount)[] withdrawals, bytes proofBytes)` ## Milestones & incidents - 2026-10-06: [Derive V3 launch](https://x.com/DeriveXYZ/status/2108069298673758548). Derive V2 balances and positions are migrated into Derive V3, which settles on Ethereum. ## Risk summary **Warning:** The project relies on program hashes that could not be successfully reproduced from their published sources (CRITICAL). ### Funds can be stolen if 1. the WithdrawFactory owner moves funds out of a withdraw escrow, or sets a malicious bridge route, 2. a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL), 3. the zkVM program does not enforce the protocol rules, as its source is not public, 4. the owner replaces the state root, the program verification key or the verifier, 5. the SP1VerifierGateway owner adds a malicious or faulty verifier route and the batch submitter routes proofs through it. ### Funds can be lost if 6. the sequencer posts an unavailable transaction root (CRITICAL), 7. the data is not available on the external provider (CRITICAL), 8. the oracle reports incorrect prices. ### Funds can be frozen if 9. the owner, the guardian or a single pauser pauses the WithdrawalOutbox. Only the owner can unpause, 10. the owner revokes the WithdrawalOutbox allowance on the SpotVault, or does not retry withdrawals whose payout failed, which only the owner can do, 11. the SP1VerifierGateway owner freezes the verifier route used for the proofs. ### Users can be censored if 12. the operator refuses to process their L1 withdrawal request, as independent proving is not possible from published artifacts. ### MEV can be extracted if 13. the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions. ### Withdrawals can be delayed if 14. they exceed the USD-denominated withdrawal rate limits, in which case they are queued until the limit refills. ## Risk analysis ### Sequencer failure Enqueue via L1 (sentiment: warning) Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone. If the oldest queued action stays unprocessed for 28d, anyone can remove the designated batch submitter, but independent proving is not possible from published artifacts and there is no exit hatch. ### State validation Validity proofs (SN) (No execution delay; sentiment: good) SNARKs are succinct zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness, but require trusted setup. ### Data availability External (sentiment: bad) Proof construction and state reconstruction rely on data posted to Celestia. Each proof commits to a Celestia header range chained from an anchor stored onchain and to a hash-chain of the batch's Celestia blobs; the oldest referenced Celestia block must be at most 2d old. The zkVM program that checks Celestia signatures and data inclusion is not public. ### Exit window None (sentiment: bad) There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. ### Proposer failure Cannot withdraw (sentiment: bad) If an L1 action stays unprocessed for 28d, anyone can remove the batch submitter and submit batches. However, the zkVM program is not public, so independent proving is not possible from published artifacts. ## Stage Derive V3 is not even a Stage 0 Appchain project. **Warning:** There is no available node software that can reconstruct L2 state transitions from available DA, so this system cannot be independently verified. ### Stage 0 2 issues need fixing. - Met: State roots are posted to Ethereum L1. - Met: A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed. - Under review: DA is attested by a committee or external DA layer, not solely by the sequencer. - Issue: The project does not self-identify as a Validium or Optimium. - Issue: No source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state from the DA layer. ### Stage 1 8 issues need fixing. **Principle** - Issue: Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely. **Guidelines** - Met: The DA layer meets minimum decentralization: a DAC with ≥5 external members under an honest-minority assumption, or an external DA chain with an attestation verifier. - Met: The proof system meets the minimum trusted setup requirements defined in the ETHBEAT [trusted setup assessment framework](https://forum.ethbeat.org/t/the-trusted-setups-framework-for-zk-catalog/381). - Met: Onchain verifiers' smart contracts (including the DA verifier) can be independently regenerated from the verifier source code. - Issue: Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators. - Issue: Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring. - Issue: The Security Council is not properly set up. - Issue: No secure onchain DA verifier is integrated on L1, so DA attestations cannot be independently verified by challengers. - Issue: The DA verifier is upgradeable with less than 7d independent exit window. - Issue: Prover source code is not published. - Issue: Not all program sources are public or not all program hashes can be independently regenerated. [Learn more about Stages](https://ethbeat.org/stages). Please keep in mind that these stages do not reflect project security, this is an opinionated assessment of project maturity based on subjective criteria, created with a goal of incentivizing projects to push toward better decentralization. Each team may have taken different paths to achieve this goal. ## Data availability ### Data is posted to Celestia Batch data is posted to Celestia as a chain of blobs in which every blob starts with the commitment of the previous one. The VerifiableApp stores the latest proven Celestia header and blob commitment, and each proof must chain from them to a newer Celestia block at most 2d old. The program is meant to prove the Celestia header transition and the inclusion of the batch's blobs, but its source is not public. The owner can re-point the stored Celestia anchor at any time. **Risks** - Funds can be lost if the sequencer posts an unavailable transaction root (CRITICAL). - Funds can be lost if the data is not available on the external provider (CRITICAL). **References** - [VerifiableApp - submitBatch and Celestia anchor](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3d35ca539242a2b5f7a08340f8b96006edeb91cb#code) ## State validation Each batch is proven with an SP1 validity proof that is verified onchain through the SP1VerifierGateway. The proof commits to the old and new state roots, the consumed L1 action queue, the withdrawals to pay out, and the Celestia data used for the batch. ### Validity proofs Margin, settlement, deposits and withdrawals are executed inside an SP1 zkVM program identified onchain by its verification key (0x00bc954fe627a8c36173e608608795425e22b4134914c7da5bd233b4718c855b). The program source is not public, so the verification key cannot be independently regenerated and what the program enforces cannot be verified. **Risks** - Funds can be stolen if the zkVM program does not enforce the protocol rules, as its source is not public. - Funds can be stolen if the owner replaces the state root, the program verification key or the verifier. - Funds can be stolen if the SP1VerifierGateway owner adds a malicious or faulty verifier route and the batch submitter routes proofs through it. - Funds can be frozen if the SP1VerifierGateway owner freezes the verifier route used for the proofs. **References** - [DIP: Launch Derive V3](https://forums.derive.xyz/t/dip-launch-derive-v3/322) ### Prover: [SP1 Hypercube](https://ethbeat.org/zk-catalog/sp1hypercube) #### Trusted setups - Gnark (Plonk): - Aztec Ignition, risk green (lowest risk) per the [Trusted Setups Risk Framework](https://forum.ethbeat.org/t/the-trusted-setups-framework-for-zk-catalog/381): Aztec Ignition is a trusted setup ceremony that was run by Aztec for KZG commitment over BN254 curve in 2019. It included 176 participants and was publicly open for participation. - Onchain verifiers: [SP1Verifier](https://etherscan.io/address/0xc3c6dDDAc8829b233Dc6536Ec024775a57b0AF2A#code) (1 successful (verified by [ETHBEAT](https://ethbeat.org))) - Used in: [Base Chain](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/base), [Mantle](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/mantle), [Celo](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/celo), [X Layer](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/xlayer), [Morph](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/morph), [Derive V3](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3), [Katana](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/katana), [RISE](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/rise), [Lumia Prism](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/lumia), [Haust Network](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/haust), [Taiko Alethia](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/taiko), [Polygon zkEVM](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/polygonzkevm), [Pentagon Chain](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/penchain) - Verifiers: 1 successful (verified by [ETHBEAT](https://ethbeat.org)) ### Program hashes #### Derive V3 exchange program Proves batches of the Derive V3 exchange: margin, settlement, deposits and withdrawals, plus a Celestia light client step and the inclusion of the batch data on Celestia. - Hash: `0x00bc954fe627a8c36173e608608795425e22b4134914c7da5bd233b4718c855b` - Repository: code unknown - Verification: unsuccessful - Used in: [Derive V3](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3) ##### Verification steps The program source is not public, so the program hash cannot be regenerated. ## Upgrades & governance The core contracts are upgradeable. Upgrades and other owner actions take effect either through a timelock with a 4h delay or immediately through a path that bypasses it. The owner can replace the state root, the program verification key, the verifier and the trusted Celestia anchor, set the batch submitter and the stall timeout, register or re-point asset vaults, and move funds held in forwarded-withdrawal escrows. A guardian can refill the withdrawal rate limits and, like a set of individual pausers, pause withdrawals. ### Past upgrades The metrics include upgrades on the currently used proxy contracts. Historical proxy contracts and changes of such are not included. - Count of upgrades: 7 - Last upgrade: 1mo 6d ago - Avg upgrade interval: 17d 4h - 2026-10-12 08:48 UTC, upgrade of [SpotVault](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2e7dF4fAf35a1599979C7E764444e112d936ec42#code): transaction [0xd202b2108e09f6755717aac2bfcda88d1e1109f35964aca0ce848047515d2d31](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xd202b2108e09f6755717aac2bfcda88d1e1109f35964aca0ce848047515d2d31), implementations: [0x6D484a11d2dCdE2daa7625e1619c140D8d1D854e](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6D484a11d2dCdE2daa7625e1619c140D8d1D854e#code) ([diff](https://disco.ethbeat.org/diff/eth:0x5D6d9D01a79625d5175D68A4B7Eb1fF390438245/eth:0x6D484a11d2dCdE2daa7625e1619c140D8d1D854e)) - 2026-10-12 08:48 UTC, upgrade of [SpotVault](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2e7dF4fAf35a1599979C7E764444e112d936ec42#code): transaction [0xd202b2108e09f6755717aac2bfcda88d1e1109f35964aca0ce848047515d2d31](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xd202b2108e09f6755717aac2bfcda88d1e1109f35964aca0ce848047515d2d31), implementations: [0x5D6d9D01a79625d5175D68A4B7Eb1fF390438245](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5D6d9D01a79625d5175D68A4B7Eb1fF390438245#code) ([diff](https://disco.ethbeat.org/diff/eth:0x6D484a11d2dCdE2daa7625e1619c140D8d1D854e/eth:0x5D6d9D01a79625d5175D68A4B7Eb1fF390438245)) - 2026-10-09 20:13 UTC, upgrade of [SpotVault](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2e7dF4fAf35a1599979C7E764444e112d936ec42#code): transaction [0x6a38727dc6bec3088ff530ddb9eee53a40c5f0e4af4506b663cebcbbb6a07e6d](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x6a38727dc6bec3088ff530ddb9eee53a40c5f0e4af4506b663cebcbbb6a07e6d), implementations: [0x6D484a11d2dCdE2daa7625e1619c140D8d1D854e](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6D484a11d2dCdE2daa7625e1619c140D8d1D854e#code) ([diff](https://disco.ethbeat.org/diff/eth:0x5D6d9D01a79625d5175D68A4B7Eb1fF390438245/eth:0x6D484a11d2dCdE2daa7625e1619c140D8d1D854e)) - 2026-10-09 20:13 UTC, upgrade of [SpotVault](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2e7dF4fAf35a1599979C7E764444e112d936ec42#code): transaction [0x6a38727dc6bec3088ff530ddb9eee53a40c5f0e4af4506b663cebcbbb6a07e6d](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x6a38727dc6bec3088ff530ddb9eee53a40c5f0e4af4506b663cebcbbb6a07e6d), implementations: [0x5D6d9D01a79625d5175D68A4B7Eb1fF390438245](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5D6d9D01a79625d5175D68A4B7Eb1fF390438245#code) ([diff](https://disco.ethbeat.org/diff/eth:0x5D6d9D01a79625d5175D68A4B7Eb1fF390438245/eth:0x5D6d9D01a79625d5175D68A4B7Eb1fF390438245)) - 2026-10-05 11:58 UTC, upgrade of [VerifiableApp](https://etherscan.io/address/0xd330145C17fB6EF2a21ACf1275Ce683A305F58BB#code): transaction [0x78a165cc9170695cc3f700818572f2ee460e42dd7a7d6afd34d460ad7aa6f4d5](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x78a165cc9170695cc3f700818572f2ee460e42dd7a7d6afd34d460ad7aa6f4d5), implementations: [0x3d35cA539242a2b5f7a08340F8b96006EdEB91CB](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3d35cA539242a2b5f7a08340F8b96006EdEB91CB#code) ([diff](https://disco.ethbeat.org/diff/eth:0xdFF4997D8B1Dc1BBCe0d1CFF21a413dB79d3537b/eth:0x3d35cA539242a2b5f7a08340F8b96006EdEB91CB)) - 2026-10-05 11:57 UTC, upgrade of [OnchainActionManager](https://etherscan.io/address/0xE366CcA474968e33b777E13905829A3b800CFAD3#code): transaction [0xa0f75fa2736ce3e264b03005805c32ea1e16164d94e3056411d1adbd7be1d6b3](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xa0f75fa2736ce3e264b03005805c32ea1e16164d94e3056411d1adbd7be1d6b3), implementations: [0x42Fd440db1b84E95B4Ab6A8Ec5fc3073B1c0A4E5](https://etherscan.io/address/0x42Fd440db1b84E95B4Ab6A8Ec5fc3073B1c0A4E5#code) ([diff](https://disco.ethbeat.org/diff/eth:0x370d06b5D6038e092d9B5ab3A36Ea5DCB813E009/eth:0x42Fd440db1b84E95B4Ab6A8Ec5fc3073B1c0A4E5)) - 2026-10-05 11:57 UTC, upgrade of [WithdrawalOutbox](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7c743D79C9C595cE332314503d84cBBb4E85FA63#code): transaction [0x651eb703e0f902bcdfa3eea4f6fa4420c8bb5aac90dd69966a8216569b95cb62](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x651eb703e0f902bcdfa3eea4f6fa4420c8bb5aac90dd69966a8216569b95cb62), implementations: [0xda213F6af45A7d6Dc728BAB03fA4a1d81ff2B418](https://etherscan.io/address/0xda213F6af45A7d6Dc728BAB03fA4a1d81ff2B418#code) ([diff](https://disco.ethbeat.org/diff/eth:0x2e101Bf62e11c002495AF0AcaC7BEB9adC7B2475/eth:0xda213F6af45A7d6Dc728BAB03fA4a1d81ff2B418)) - 2026-10-01 12:51 UTC, deployment of [VerifiableApp](https://etherscan.io/address/0xd330145C17fB6EF2a21ACf1275Ce683A305F58BB#code): transaction [0x23ee56d3116b72bb29bbd8851b473305514612ad7106a2a7cfde7073f7fc725e](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x23ee56d3116b72bb29bbd8851b473305514612ad7106a2a7cfde7073f7fc725e), implementations: [0xdFF4997D8B1Dc1BBCe0d1CFF21a413dB79d3537b](https://etherscan.io/address/0xdFF4997D8B1Dc1BBCe0d1CFF21a413dB79d3537b#code) - 2026-10-01 12:51 UTC, deployment of [OnchainActionManager](https://etherscan.io/address/0xE366CcA474968e33b777E13905829A3b800CFAD3#code): transaction [0xe21c089646cc8fee6750e6e75644e31c97b4e0211782134efe5e5cd3e11595c9](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe21c089646cc8fee6750e6e75644e31c97b4e0211782134efe5e5cd3e11595c9), implementations: [0x370d06b5D6038e092d9B5ab3A36Ea5DCB813E009](https://etherscan.io/address/0x370d06b5D6038e092d9B5ab3A36Ea5DCB813E009#code) - 2026-10-01 12:50 UTC, deployment of [SpotVault](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2e7dF4fAf35a1599979C7E764444e112d936ec42#code): transaction [0x6abdad8e2eca4f6ec25940d2b5141f0b8202131858896f3f9619386fb1ed3829](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x6abdad8e2eca4f6ec25940d2b5141f0b8202131858896f3f9619386fb1ed3829), implementations: [0x5D6d9D01a79625d5175D68A4B7Eb1fF390438245](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5D6d9D01a79625d5175D68A4B7Eb1fF390438245#code) - 2026-10-01 12:50 UTC, deployment of [WithdrawalOutbox](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7c743D79C9C595cE332314503d84cBBb4E85FA63#code): transaction [0xa8e7c1369fb8e3408a6bec4074c21ddbf38f1ff956563ea0cd3db3418a693378](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xa8e7c1369fb8e3408a6bec4074c21ddbf38f1ff956563ea0cd3db3418a693378), implementations: [0x2e101Bf62e11c002495AF0AcaC7BEB9adC7B2475](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2e101Bf62e11c002495AF0AcaC7BEB9adC7B2475#code) ## Updates Each date links the update on the HTML page, which also shows its contract diffs. ### [2026-11-16 17:40 UTC](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3?update=710bc3f5) (17 changes) Initial discovery of Derive V3: VerifiableApp, OnchainActionManager, WithdrawalOutbox, SpotVault, WithdrawFactory, their owner multisig with its timelock and bypass members, the guardian, pausers and keepers. ## Operator ### The system has a centralized operator The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system. Orders are matched offchain by a centralized engine, and only the designated batch submitter can submit batches unless it is removed through the stall timeout. **Risks** - MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions. ### Users can queue withdrawals on L1 Deposits and withdrawal requests submitted on L1 are appended to an onchain queue. Batches consume it in order but are not required to consume any of it. If the oldest queued action stays unprocessed for 28d, anyone can remove the designated batch submitter and submit batches themselves. Since the zkVM program is not public, independent proving is not possible from published artifacts, and there is no exit hatch. **Risks** - Users can be censored if the operator refuses to process their L1 withdrawal request, as independent proving is not possible from published artifacts. ## Withdrawals ### Regular exit The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. ZK proofs are required to settle blocks. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. **Risks** - Funds can be frozen if the owner, the guardian or a single pauser pauses the WithdrawalOutbox. Only the owner can unpause. - Funds can be frozen if the owner revokes the WithdrawalOutbox allowance on the SpotVault, or does not retry withdrawals whose payout failed, which only the owner can do. - Withdrawals can be delayed if they exceed the USD-denominated withdrawal rate limits, in which case they are queued until the limit refills. ## Other considerations ### Forwarded withdrawals Users can withdraw to a deterministic escrow deployed by the WithdrawFactory, from which keepers bridge the funds to another chain via LayerZero OFT or CCIP. Funds waiting in these escrows are not protected by the validity proofs. **Risks** - Funds can be stolen if the WithdrawFactory owner moves funds out of a withdraw escrow, or sets a malicious bridge route. **References** - [Derive docs - Transfers & Withdrawals](https://docs.derive.xyz/trading/transfers-withdrawals) ### Prices are provided by an offchain oracle Margin, liquidation and option settlement use spot, forward, perpetual, volatility and rate feeds provided by Block Scholes. These feeds are consumed inside the zkVM program, whose source is not public. **Risks** - Funds can be lost if the oracle reports incorrect prices. **References** - [Derive docs - Oracles](https://docs.derive.xyz/oracles) ## Permissions Explore these contracts and permissions in Disco, ETHBEAT's contract explorer: https://disco.ethbeat.org/ui/p/derivev3 ### Ethereum #### Actors ##### Derive Multisig Addresses: [0x169a99B9958386a5D91E732Ed08B344946A92391](https://etherscan.io/address/0x169a99B9958386a5D91E732Ed08B344946A92391) A Multisig with 3/5 threshold. - Can upgrade **with 4h delay** - SpotVault [via: DeriveTimelock with 4h delay → Derive Owner Multisig → ProxyAdmin] - WithdrawalOutbox [via: DeriveTimelock with 4h delay → Derive Owner Multisig → ProxyAdmin] - VerifiableApp [via: DeriveTimelock with 4h delay → Derive Owner Multisig → ProxyAdmin] - OnchainActionManager [via: DeriveTimelock with 4h delay → Derive Owner Multisig → ProxyAdmin] - Can interact with DeriveTimelock - cancel queued transactions - manage all access control roles **with 4h delay** [via: DeriveTimelock with 4h delay] - propose transactions - Can interact with SpotVault - approve or revoke the withdrawal outbox's allowance for any token **with 4h delay** [via: DeriveTimelock with 4h delay → Derive Owner Multisig] - Can interact with WithdrawalOutbox - register assets and their vaults, set rate limits, static prices and the minimum time between guardian refills, appoint the guardian and pausers, pause and unpause, and pay out deferred withdrawals without rate limits **with 4h delay** [via: DeriveTimelock with 4h delay → Derive Owner Multisig] - Can interact with VerifiableApp - replace the state root, the program verification key, the verifier and the trusted Celestia anchor, and set the batch submitter and its stall timeout **with 4h delay** [via: DeriveTimelock with 4h delay → Derive Owner Multisig] - Can interact with OnchainActionManager - withdraw the collected withdrawal fees **with 4h delay** [via: DeriveTimelock with 4h delay → Derive Owner Multisig] - Can interact with WithdrawFactory - set the bridge route per token and chain, appoint keepers, and move funds held in any withdraw escrow or in the factory to the owner **with 4h delay** [via: DeriveTimelock with 4h delay → Derive Owner Multisig] Participants (5): [0x6074595197e5637c1b50FDE0e6244Ff43634289B](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3#EOA-7) (EOA 7), [0x7E1fbF7631eCba68d08bC75534c0c56bb5600AD6](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3#EOA-2,-EOA-3,-EOA-8-and-EOA-9) (EOA 8), [0x1034487e0B3442ab302b8368713773abEEeF2e44](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3#EOA-2,-EOA-3,-EOA-8-and-EOA-9) (EOA 2), [0x192b678f988738E7F5e2641B3EF0cde603566705](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3#EOA-2,-EOA-3,-EOA-8-and-EOA-9) (EOA 3), [0x87327f19d857ae3530169acEa0EDd4ab1064229E](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3#EOA-2,-EOA-3,-EOA-8-and-EOA-9) (EOA 9) ##### Derive Bypass Multisig Addresses: [0x5F8D40613d49179376a200cc808d322f4331453a](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5F8D40613d49179376a200cc808d322f4331453a) A Multisig with 6/8 threshold. Member of Derive Owner Multisig. - Can upgrade **with no delay** - SpotVault [via: Derive Owner Multisig → ProxyAdmin] - WithdrawalOutbox [via: Derive Owner Multisig → ProxyAdmin] - VerifiableApp [via: Derive Owner Multisig → ProxyAdmin] - OnchainActionManager [via: Derive Owner Multisig → ProxyAdmin] - Can interact with SpotVault - approve or revoke the withdrawal outbox's allowance for any token [via: Derive Owner Multisig] - Can interact with WithdrawalOutbox - register assets and their vaults, set rate limits, static prices and the minimum time between guardian refills, appoint the guardian and pausers, pause and unpause, and pay out deferred withdrawals without rate limits [via: Derive Owner Multisig] - Can interact with VerifiableApp - replace the state root, the program verification key, the verifier and the trusted Celestia anchor, and set the batch submitter and its stall timeout [via: Derive Owner Multisig] - Can interact with OnchainActionManager - withdraw the collected withdrawal fees [via: Derive Owner Multisig] - Can interact with WithdrawFactory - set the bridge route per token and chain, appoint keepers, and move funds held in any withdraw escrow or in the factory to the owner [via: Derive Owner Multisig] Participants (8): [0x6074595197e5637c1b50FDE0e6244Ff43634289B](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3#EOA-7) (EOA 7), [0x7E1fbF7631eCba68d08bC75534c0c56bb5600AD6](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3#EOA-2,-EOA-3,-EOA-8-and-EOA-9) (EOA 8), [0x1034487e0B3442ab302b8368713773abEEeF2e44](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3#EOA-2,-EOA-3,-EOA-8-and-EOA-9) (EOA 2), [0x192b678f988738E7F5e2641B3EF0cde603566705](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3#EOA-2,-EOA-3,-EOA-8-and-EOA-9) (EOA 3), [0x87327f19d857ae3530169acEa0EDd4ab1064229E](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3#EOA-2,-EOA-3,-EOA-8-and-EOA-9) (EOA 9), [0x5759C0B7e9Dd894c1c4516558eE739746CF43f4f](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3#EOA-5-and-EOA-6) (EOA 5), [0x5b216A8fdF0dc78807730a17EDC0374603E3666e](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3#EOA-5-and-EOA-6) (EOA 6), [0x8C9aB48884c20f5760F5aB57cFe0a02b7b43E9c6](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8C9aB48884c20f5760F5aB57cFe0a02b7b43E9c6) ##### Derive Guardian Multisig Addresses: [0x682CD085aC63739a9F44E069E91BB6AA09a312E8](https://etherscan.io/address/0x682CD085aC63739a9F44E069E91BB6AA09a312E8) A Multisig with 2/7 threshold. - Can interact with WithdrawalOutbox - refill withdrawal rate limit buckets and pause withdrawals Participants (7): [0x7E1fbF7631eCba68d08bC75534c0c56bb5600AD6](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3#EOA-2,-EOA-3,-EOA-8-and-EOA-9) (EOA 8), [0x1034487e0B3442ab302b8368713773abEEeF2e44](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3#EOA-2,-EOA-3,-EOA-8-and-EOA-9) (EOA 2), [0x192b678f988738E7F5e2641B3EF0cde603566705](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3#EOA-2,-EOA-3,-EOA-8-and-EOA-9) (EOA 3), [0x87327f19d857ae3530169acEa0EDd4ab1064229E](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3#EOA-2,-EOA-3,-EOA-8-and-EOA-9) (EOA 9), [0x5759C0B7e9Dd894c1c4516558eE739746CF43f4f](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3#EOA-5-and-EOA-6) (EOA 5), [0x5b216A8fdF0dc78807730a17EDC0374603E3666e](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3#EOA-5-and-EOA-6) (EOA 6), [0xA0A2A7d71AB8908238aCbf73C3F6f274eE8DeEf4](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3#EOA-10) (EOA 10) ##### SP1VerifierGatewayMultisig Addresses: [0xCafEf00d348Adbd57c37d1B77e0619C6244C6878](https://etherscan.io/address/0xCafEf00d348Adbd57c37d1B77e0619C6244C6878) A Multisig with 2/3 threshold. - Can interact with SP1VerifierGateway - affect the liveness and safety of the gateway - can transfer ownership, add and freeze verifier routes Participants (3): [0xBaB2c2aF5b91695e65955DA60d63aD1b2aE81126](https://etherscan.io/address/0xBaB2c2aF5b91695e65955DA60d63aD1b2aE81126), [0x72Ff26D9517324eEFA89A48B75c5df41132c4f54](https://etherscan.io/address/0x72Ff26D9517324eEFA89A48B75c5df41132c4f54), [0x9395e83720bf2D8ac6435f9c520b48E289Cb8885](https://etherscan.io/address/0x9395e83720bf2D8ac6435f9c520b48E289Cb8885) Used in: [Celo](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/celo#SP1VerifierGatewayMultisig), [Fluent](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/fluent#SP1VerifierGatewayMultisig), [Mantle](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/mantle#SP1VerifierGatewayMultisig), [RISE](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/rise#SP1VerifierGatewayMultisig), [Taiko Alethia](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/taiko#SP1VerifierGatewayMultisig), [X Layer](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/xlayer#SP1VerifierGatewayMultisig) ##### Derive Owner Multisig Addresses: [0x62c004a89EDBd7bECBdf54E14779B7e7F5b390F7](https://etherscan.io/address/0x62c004a89EDBd7bECBdf54E14779B7e7F5b390F7) A Multisig with 1/2 threshold. Participants (2): [0x12D612647e8bcacec9148e477CAdE67bD07abc78](https://etherscan.io/address/0x12D612647e8bcacec9148e477CAdE67bD07abc78) (DeriveTimelock), [0x5F8D40613d49179376a200cc808d322f4331453a](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3#Derive Bypass Multisig) (Derive Bypass Multisig) ##### EOA 1 Addresses: [0x000000c88C2C8A7F8317783f2268eB2B9b41257E](https://etherscan.io/address/0x000000c88C2C8A7F8317783f2268eB2B9b41257E) - Can interact with VerifiableApp - exclusively submit batches with validity proofs, until the oldest unprocessed L1 action is older than the submitter stall timeout ##### 4 EOAs Addresses: [0x1034487e0B3442ab302b8368713773abEEeF2e44](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1034487e0B3442ab302b8368713773abEEeF2e44) (EOA 2), [0x192b678f988738E7F5e2641B3EF0cde603566705](https://etherscan.io/address/0x192b678f988738E7F5e2641B3EF0cde603566705) (EOA 3), [0x7E1fbF7631eCba68d08bC75534c0c56bb5600AD6](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7E1fbF7631eCba68d08bC75534c0c56bb5600AD6) (EOA 8), [0x87327f19d857ae3530169acEa0EDd4ab1064229E](https://etherscan.io/address/0x87327f19d857ae3530169acEa0EDd4ab1064229E) (EOA 9) Member of Derive Multisig, Derive Bypass Multisig, Derive Guardian Multisig. - Can interact with DeriveTimelock - cancel queued transactions - execute transactions that are ready - Can interact with WithdrawalOutbox - pause all withdrawal payouts. Only the owner can unpause ##### 2 EOAs (0x546c…1E09) Addresses: [0x546caBdF948d1f0E9102B28Fc48E77F29Cb01E09](https://etherscan.io/address/0x546caBdF948d1f0E9102B28Fc48E77F29Cb01E09) (EOA 4), [0xB3A5e1E4c82a7C88BD13828e444e5Ad8E2279E3a](https://etherscan.io/address/0xB3A5e1E4c82a7C88BD13828e444e5Ad8E2279E3a) (EOA 11) - Can interact with WithdrawFactory - bridge the balance of a withdraw escrow to its recipient on the configured destination chain ##### 2 EOAs (0x5759…3f4f) Addresses: [0x5759C0B7e9Dd894c1c4516558eE739746CF43f4f](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5759C0B7e9Dd894c1c4516558eE739746CF43f4f) (EOA 5), [0x5b216A8fdF0dc78807730a17EDC0374603E3666e](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5b216A8fdF0dc78807730a17EDC0374603E3666e) (EOA 6) Member of Derive Bypass Multisig, Derive Guardian Multisig. - Can interact with WithdrawalOutbox - pause all withdrawal payouts. Only the owner can unpause ##### EOA 7 Addresses: [0x6074595197e5637c1b50FDE0e6244Ff43634289B](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6074595197e5637c1b50FDE0e6244Ff43634289B) Member of Derive Multisig, Derive Bypass Multisig. - Can interact with DeriveTimelock - cancel queued transactions - execute transactions that are ready ##### EOA 10 Addresses: [0xA0A2A7d71AB8908238aCbf73C3F6f274eE8DeEf4](https://etherscan.io/address/0xA0A2A7d71AB8908238aCbf73C3F6f274eE8DeEf4) Member of Derive Guardian Multisig. - Can interact with WithdrawalOutbox - pause all withdrawal payouts. Only the owner can unpause ## Smart contracts The current deployment carries some associated risks: - Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL). Explore these contracts and permissions in Disco, ETHBEAT's contract explorer: https://disco.ethbeat.org/ui/p/derivev3 ### Ethereum #### DeriveTimelock Addresses: [0x12D612647e8bcacec9148e477CAdE67bD07abc78](https://etherscan.io/address/0x12D612647e8bcacec9148e477CAdE67bD07abc78#code) A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 4h. Member of Derive Owner Multisig. - Roles: - **canceller**: Derive Multisig, EOA 2, EOA 3, EOA 7, EOA 8, EOA 9 - **defaultAdmin**: DeriveTimelock; ultimately Derive Multisig - **executor**: EOA 2, EOA 3, EOA 7, EOA 8, EOA 9 - **proposer**: Derive Multisig #### ProxyAdmin (4 instances) Addresses: [0x2c53cbB96fb65e8711dAAe530c87473789a13781](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2c53cbB96fb65e8711dAAe530c87473789a13781#code), [0x4EcBfaBF336a757FE82898e0e1083a6Cbb042C3D](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4EcBfaBF336a757FE82898e0e1083a6Cbb042C3D#code), [0xD773a38B81bBe7992209D6c4ef663c6A7F6cbfBd](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD773a38B81bBe7992209D6c4ef663c6A7F6cbfBd#code), [0xeB26aA88C73D3a03fE82be3C241B6ccd2D596811](https://etherscan.io/address/0xeB26aA88C73D3a03fE82be3C241B6ccd2D596811#code) - Roles: - **owner**: Derive Owner Multisig #### SpotVault (escrow) Addresses: [0x2e7dF4fAf35a1599979C7E764444e112d936ec42](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2e7dF4fAf35a1599979C7E764444e112d936ec42#code), [0x5D6d9D01a79625d5175D68A4B7Eb1fF390438245](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5D6d9D01a79625d5175D68A4B7Eb1fF390438245#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x4EcBfaBF336a757FE82898e0e1083a6Cbb042C3D](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4EcBfaBF336a757FE82898e0e1083a6Cbb042C3D#code) (Admin) **Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: 4, Last upgrade: 1mo 6d ago, Avg upgrade interval: 9d 10h) - 2026-10-12 08:48 UTC, upgrade of [SpotVault](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2e7dF4fAf35a1599979C7E764444e112d936ec42#code): transaction [0xd202b2108e09f6755717aac2bfcda88d1e1109f35964aca0ce848047515d2d31](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xd202b2108e09f6755717aac2bfcda88d1e1109f35964aca0ce848047515d2d31), implementations: [0x6D484a11d2dCdE2daa7625e1619c140D8d1D854e](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6D484a11d2dCdE2daa7625e1619c140D8d1D854e#code) ([diff](https://disco.ethbeat.org/diff/eth:0x5D6d9D01a79625d5175D68A4B7Eb1fF390438245/eth:0x6D484a11d2dCdE2daa7625e1619c140D8d1D854e)) - 2026-10-12 08:48 UTC, upgrade of [SpotVault](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2e7dF4fAf35a1599979C7E764444e112d936ec42#code): transaction [0xd202b2108e09f6755717aac2bfcda88d1e1109f35964aca0ce848047515d2d31](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xd202b2108e09f6755717aac2bfcda88d1e1109f35964aca0ce848047515d2d31), implementations: [0x5D6d9D01a79625d5175D68A4B7Eb1fF390438245](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5D6d9D01a79625d5175D68A4B7Eb1fF390438245#code) ([diff](https://disco.ethbeat.org/diff/eth:0x6D484a11d2dCdE2daa7625e1619c140D8d1D854e/eth:0x5D6d9D01a79625d5175D68A4B7Eb1fF390438245)) - 2026-10-09 20:13 UTC, upgrade of [SpotVault](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2e7dF4fAf35a1599979C7E764444e112d936ec42#code): transaction [0x6a38727dc6bec3088ff530ddb9eee53a40c5f0e4af4506b663cebcbbb6a07e6d](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x6a38727dc6bec3088ff530ddb9eee53a40c5f0e4af4506b663cebcbbb6a07e6d), implementations: [0x6D484a11d2dCdE2daa7625e1619c140D8d1D854e](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6D484a11d2dCdE2daa7625e1619c140D8d1D854e#code) ([diff](https://disco.ethbeat.org/diff/eth:0x5D6d9D01a79625d5175D68A4B7Eb1fF390438245/eth:0x6D484a11d2dCdE2daa7625e1619c140D8d1D854e)) - 2026-10-09 20:13 UTC, upgrade of [SpotVault](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2e7dF4fAf35a1599979C7E764444e112d936ec42#code): transaction [0x6a38727dc6bec3088ff530ddb9eee53a40c5f0e4af4506b663cebcbbb6a07e6d](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x6a38727dc6bec3088ff530ddb9eee53a40c5f0e4af4506b663cebcbbb6a07e6d), implementations: [0x5D6d9D01a79625d5175D68A4B7Eb1fF390438245](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5D6d9D01a79625d5175D68A4B7Eb1fF390438245#code) ([diff](https://disco.ethbeat.org/diff/eth:0x5D6d9D01a79625d5175D68A4B7Eb1fF390438245/eth:0x5D6d9D01a79625d5175D68A4B7Eb1fF390438245)) - 2026-10-01 12:50 UTC, deployment of [SpotVault](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2e7dF4fAf35a1599979C7E764444e112d936ec42#code): transaction [0x6abdad8e2eca4f6ec25940d2b5141f0b8202131858896f3f9619386fb1ed3829](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x6abdad8e2eca4f6ec25940d2b5141f0b8202131858896f3f9619386fb1ed3829), implementations: [0x5D6d9D01a79625d5175D68A4B7Eb1fF390438245](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5D6d9D01a79625d5175D68A4B7Eb1fF390438245#code) Escrow for the collateral deposited to Derive. It grants WithdrawalOutbox unlimited allowance for approved tokens. - Roles: - **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Derive Bypass Multisig, Derive Multisig - **owner**: Derive Owner Multisig; ultimately Derive Bypass Multisig, Derive Multisig All supported tokens in this escrow are included in the value secured calculation. Can be upgraded by: Derive Multisig with 4h delay, Derive Bypass Multisig with no delay #### WithdrawalOutbox Addresses: [0x7c743D79C9C595cE332314503d84cBBb4E85FA63](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7c743D79C9C595cE332314503d84cBBb4E85FA63#code), [0xda213F6af45A7d6Dc728BAB03fA4a1d81ff2B418](https://etherscan.io/address/0xda213F6af45A7d6Dc728BAB03fA4a1d81ff2B418#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xD773a38B81bBe7992209D6c4ef663c6A7F6cbfBd](https://etherscan.io/address/0xD773a38B81bBe7992209D6c4ef663c6A7F6cbfBd#code) (Admin) **Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: 1, Last upgrade: 1mo 13d ago, Avg upgrade interval: 23d 14h) - 2026-10-05 11:57 UTC, upgrade of [WithdrawalOutbox](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7c743D79C9C595cE332314503d84cBBb4E85FA63#code): transaction [0x651eb703e0f902bcdfa3eea4f6fa4420c8bb5aac90dd69966a8216569b95cb62](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x651eb703e0f902bcdfa3eea4f6fa4420c8bb5aac90dd69966a8216569b95cb62), implementations: [0xda213F6af45A7d6Dc728BAB03fA4a1d81ff2B418](https://etherscan.io/address/0xda213F6af45A7d6Dc728BAB03fA4a1d81ff2B418#code) ([diff](https://disco.ethbeat.org/diff/eth:0x2e101Bf62e11c002495AF0AcaC7BEB9adC7B2475/eth:0xda213F6af45A7d6Dc728BAB03fA4a1d81ff2B418)) - 2026-10-01 12:50 UTC, deployment of [WithdrawalOutbox](https://etherscan.io/address/0x7c743D79C9C595cE332314503d84cBBb4E85FA63#code): transaction [0xa8e7c1369fb8e3408a6bec4074c21ddbf38f1ff956563ea0cd3db3418a693378](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xa8e7c1369fb8e3408a6bec4074c21ddbf38f1ff956563ea0cd3db3418a693378), implementations: [0x2e101Bf62e11c002495AF0AcaC7BEB9adC7B2475](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2e101Bf62e11c002495AF0AcaC7BEB9adC7B2475#code) Pays out withdrawals committed to by batches proven in VerifiableApp from the registered asset vaults, subject to USD-denominated per-recipient and global rate limits. - Roles: - **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Derive Bypass Multisig, Derive Multisig - **guardian**: Derive Guardian Multisig - **owner**: Derive Owner Multisig; ultimately Derive Bypass Multisig, Derive Multisig - **pausers**: EOA 10, EOA 2, EOA 3, EOA 5, EOA 6, EOA 8, EOA 9 Can be upgraded by: Derive Multisig with 4h delay, Derive Bypass Multisig with no delay #### DepositEscrow Addresses: [0xA20f87a5443E3Be4925109cA189134c825932560](https://etherscan.io/address/0xA20f87a5443E3Be4925109cA189134c825932560#code) #### VerifiableApp Addresses: [0xd330145C17fB6EF2a21ACf1275Ce683A305F58BB](https://etherscan.io/address/0xd330145C17fB6EF2a21ACf1275Ce683A305F58BB#code), [0x3d35cA539242a2b5f7a08340F8b96006EdEB91CB](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3d35cA539242a2b5f7a08340F8b96006EdEB91CB#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0x2c53cbB96fb65e8711dAAe530c87473789a13781](https://etherscan.io/address/0x2c53cbB96fb65e8711dAAe530c87473789a13781#code) (Admin) **Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: 1, Last upgrade: 1mo 13d ago, Avg upgrade interval: 23d 14h) - 2026-10-05 11:58 UTC, upgrade of [VerifiableApp](https://etherscan.io/address/0xd330145C17fB6EF2a21ACf1275Ce683A305F58BB#code): transaction [0x78a165cc9170695cc3f700818572f2ee460e42dd7a7d6afd34d460ad7aa6f4d5](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x78a165cc9170695cc3f700818572f2ee460e42dd7a7d6afd34d460ad7aa6f4d5), implementations: [0x3d35cA539242a2b5f7a08340F8b96006EdEB91CB](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3d35cA539242a2b5f7a08340F8b96006EdEB91CB#code) ([diff](https://disco.ethbeat.org/diff/eth:0xdFF4997D8B1Dc1BBCe0d1CFF21a413dB79d3537b/eth:0x3d35cA539242a2b5f7a08340F8b96006EdEB91CB)) - 2026-10-01 12:51 UTC, deployment of [VerifiableApp](https://etherscan.io/address/0xd330145C17fB6EF2a21ACf1275Ce683A305F58BB#code): transaction [0x23ee56d3116b72bb29bbd8851b473305514612ad7106a2a7cfde7073f7fc725e](https://etherscan.io/tx/0x23ee56d3116b72bb29bbd8851b473305514612ad7106a2a7cfde7073f7fc725e), implementations: [0xdFF4997D8B1Dc1BBCe0d1CFF21a413dB79d3537b](https://etherscan.io/address/0xdFF4997D8B1Dc1BBCe0d1CFF21a413dB79d3537b#code) Holds the state root and verifies SP1 validity proofs for each batch through SP1VerifierGateway. Each proof also commits to a Celestia header range and blob hash-chain, which this contract chains from a stored Celestia anchor and checks for freshness. - Roles: - **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Derive Bypass Multisig, Derive Multisig - **batchSubmitter**: EOA 1 - **owner**: Derive Owner Multisig; ultimately Derive Bypass Multisig, Derive Multisig Can be upgraded by: Derive Multisig with 4h delay, Derive Bypass Multisig with no delay #### OnchainActionManager Addresses: [0xE366CcA474968e33b777E13905829A3b800CFAD3](https://etherscan.io/address/0xE366CcA474968e33b777E13905829A3b800CFAD3#code), [0x42Fd440db1b84E95B4Ab6A8Ec5fc3073B1c0A4E5](https://etherscan.io/address/0x42Fd440db1b84E95B4Ab6A8Ec5fc3073B1c0A4E5#code) (Implementation (Upgradable)), [0xeB26aA88C73D3a03fE82be3C241B6ccd2D596811](https://etherscan.io/address/0xeB26aA88C73D3a03fE82be3C241B6ccd2D596811#code) (Admin) **Past upgrades** (Count of upgrades: 1, Last upgrade: 1mo 13d ago, Avg upgrade interval: 23d 14h) - 2026-10-05 11:57 UTC, upgrade of [OnchainActionManager](https://etherscan.io/address/0xE366CcA474968e33b777E13905829A3b800CFAD3#code): transaction [0xa0f75fa2736ce3e264b03005805c32ea1e16164d94e3056411d1adbd7be1d6b3](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xa0f75fa2736ce3e264b03005805c32ea1e16164d94e3056411d1adbd7be1d6b3), implementations: [0x42Fd440db1b84E95B4Ab6A8Ec5fc3073B1c0A4E5](https://etherscan.io/address/0x42Fd440db1b84E95B4Ab6A8Ec5fc3073B1c0A4E5#code) ([diff](https://disco.ethbeat.org/diff/eth:0x370d06b5D6038e092d9B5ab3A36Ea5DCB813E009/eth:0x42Fd440db1b84E95B4Ab6A8Ec5fc3073B1c0A4E5)) - 2026-10-01 12:51 UTC, deployment of [OnchainActionManager](https://etherscan.io/address/0xE366CcA474968e33b777E13905829A3b800CFAD3#code): transaction [0xe21c089646cc8fee6750e6e75644e31c97b4e0211782134efe5e5cd3e11595c9](https://etherscan.io/tx/0xe21c089646cc8fee6750e6e75644e31c97b4e0211782134efe5e5cd3e11595c9), implementations: [0x370d06b5D6038e092d9B5ab3A36Ea5DCB813E009](https://etherscan.io/address/0x370d06b5D6038e092d9B5ab3A36Ea5DCB813E009#code) Entry point for L1 deposits and withdrawal requests. Every action is appended to an accumulator that batches consume in order. - Roles: - **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Derive Bypass Multisig, Derive Multisig - **owner**: Derive Owner Multisig; ultimately Derive Bypass Multisig, Derive Multisig Can be upgraded by: Derive Multisig with 4h delay, Derive Bypass Multisig with no delay #### WithdrawFactory Addresses: [0xFec48bBC648bd2284520d862Ec67fc68F709915e](https://etherscan.io/address/0xFec48bBC648bd2284520d862Ec67fc68F709915e#code) Deploys a deterministic escrow per recipient and destination chain. Withdrawals paid to such an escrow are bridged onward by keepers via LayerZero OFT or CCIP. - Roles: - **keepers**: EOA 11, EOA 4 - **owner**: Derive Owner Multisig; ultimately Derive Bypass Multisig, Derive Multisig #### SP1VerifierGateway Addresses: [0x3B6041173B80E77f038f3F2C0f9744f04837185e](https://etherscan.io/address/0x3B6041173B80E77f038f3F2C0f9744f04837185e#code) This contract is the router for zk proof verification. It stores the mapping between identifiers and the address of onchain verifier contracts, routing each identifier to the corresponding verifier contract. - Roles: - **owner**: SP1VerifierGatewayMultisig Implementation used in: [Celo](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/celo#SP1VerifierGateway), [Mantle](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/mantle#SP1VerifierGateway), [RISE](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/rise#SP1VerifierGateway), [Taiko Alethia](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/taiko#SP1VerifierGateway) #### SP1Verifier Addresses: [0xc3c6dDDAc8829b233Dc6536Ec024775a57b0AF2A](https://etherscan.io/address/0xc3c6dDDAc8829b233Dc6536Ec024775a57b0AF2A#code) Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v6.1.0). Implementation used in: [Base Chain](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/base#SP1Verifier), [Mantle](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/mantle#SP1Verifier), [Celo](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/celo#SP1Verifier), [X Layer](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/xlayer#SP1Verifier), [Katana](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/katana#SP1Verifier), [RISE](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/rise#SP1Verifier), [Lumia Prism](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/lumia#SP1Verifier), [Haust Network](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/haust#SP1Verifier), [Taiko Alethia](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/taiko#SP1Verifier), [Polygon zkEVM](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/polygonzkevm#SP1Verifier), [Pentagon Chain](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/penchain#SP1Verifier) ### Program hashes #### Derive V3 exchange program Proves batches of the Derive V3 exchange: margin, settlement, deposits and withdrawals, plus a Celestia light client step and the inclusion of the batch data on Celestia. - Hash: `0x00bc954fe627a8c36173e608608795425e22b4134914c7da5bd233b4718c855b` - Repository: code unknown - Verification: unsuccessful - Used in: [Derive V3](https://ethbeat.org/layer2s/projects/derivev3) ##### Verification steps The program source is not public, so the program hash cannot be regenerated.